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MILITARY STRATEGY: COMMENTS ON NEW U.S. BOOK

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[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Gen N. Petrov: "The U.S. 'Grand Strategy' for the 1980's (According to the Views of M. Taylor and Other U.S. Generals and Admirals)"]

[Text] The campaign for détente and lessening of the threat of a nuclear missile world war constitutes for the Soviet Union a basic factor of foreign policy and international affairs. "Today the main guarantee of a peaceful future for mankind lies in this struggle," stressed CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Such a prospect, however, is not to the liking of certain circles in Western countries, especially the United States. Serving their interests, the U.S. Institute for Sociopolitical Studies has published a book entitled "Grand Strategy for the 1980's," written by retired U.S. generals and admirals.*

We read in the introduction that the authors set for themselves the task of showing the principal directions and areas of development of U.S. strategy and military might for the 1980's and their interrelationship with Washington's global foreign-policy objectives.

The content of this book is determined in large measure by the fact that the active military service of the authors occurred primarily during the

---

* M. Taylor -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-1964); E. Zumwalt -- Chief of Staff of the Navy (1970-1974); B. Holloway -- Commanding Officer, Strategic Air Command (1968-1972); T. Milton -- U.S. representative on NATO Military Committee (1969-1974); B. Palmer -- Commanding Officer, Readiness Command (1973-1974).

"cold war" period. This is reflected in their theoretical arguments and practical recommendations. They are hostile toward the process of détente and consider the political and military rivalry between the United States and the USSR to be for all practical purposes a constant factor in international affairs. Therefore it is their opinion that the United States should continue in the future intensively pursuing a rigid foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, based on a "strategy of deterrence."

This strategy is defined as a "balance of terror," based on the position that U.S. nuclear forces should at all times be sufficient to "inflict such massive damage on the Soviet Union that it would paralyze the operation of its government edifice, economy, and capability to wage war for an indefinitely long period of time, regardless of any countermeasures on the part of the Soviet Union." "I believe," states Taylor, "that our armed forces can deal such a blow at the present time, and they should retain this capability in the future."

Soviet foreign policy is presented by the authors in a patently distorted form, as allegedly threatening Western Europe, the developing nations and the United States. At the same time they hypocritically portray their own country, with its powerful strategic offensive nuclear forces, as the principal "guarantor" of peace.

The retired generals see as the essence of the U.S. "grand strategy" for the 1980's a further buildup of U.S. nuclear potential, strengthening of forward-based forces, increasing the military strength of the allies, and the possibility of U.S. participation in the military conflicts of other countries. The main emphasis is placed on a policy "from a position of strength," which is unequivocally defined as U.S. military superiority over all other countries, and the USSR in particular. And although the arguments presented by these authors at times mention the necessity of observing parity, an equality of forces, they state at the same time that U.S. superiority should nevertheless be maintained. "It is vitally important for the future of the United States," the book states, "that the scales tip in this country's favor.... He who possesses superiority in strategic nuclear power is able to compel others and to achieve his own objectives without firing a single shot, be it nuclear or conventional weapons." Implementing these plans, U.S. militarist circles are artificially delaying ratification of the SALT II treaty and are pushing through a NATO decision to produce and deploy its own intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

U.S. foreign policy, in the opinion of these retired generals, should be reliably backed up by military might. "Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments." It should not only be supported by military might but should also employ military force more boldly. As the authors frankly acknowledge, "use of military force to achieve objectives was the historically universally acknowledged prerogative of powerful nations. As regards our country (that is, the United States -- N. P.), throughout our history we have constantly turned to military force as an adjunct to diplomacy.... The future will evidently not differ from the past. Military force will continue to supplement foreign-policy activity."

In the estimate of these former top Pentagon officials, employment of military force in the immediate future is possible primarily against "third world" countries in the struggle for resources: "Force will be required to prevent developing countries from holding back essential raw materials and utilizing them for purposes of political or economic blackmail." They believe that the U.S. leadership should decide to employ military force and become liberated from the "influence of the Vietnam syndrome."

Discussing U.S. foreign-policy pretentions, Taylor emphasizes that, beginning in the 1950's, they were "too ambitious in comparison with the military means which the United States possessed to achieve them." The authors see as one of the causes of that situation the inconstancy of U.S. foreign policy, which is usually derived at any given moment from an aggregate of presidential statements, election campaign promises, congressional decisions and executive agreements. Any of these can be suddenly and unexpectedly revised or revoked. "Our foreign policy is frequently a reaction to occurring events and is guided by practical advantage." The authors are of the opinion that the country lacks firm direction of foreign policy.

In this connection the recommendations (principles of strategy) of these former U.S. military leaders boil down to the following.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations are the principal adversaries of the United States. Precisely these countries, today and into the foreseeable future, constitute the main obstacle in the path of achievement by the United States of its objectives. Intimidating U.S. bloc partners with the claim that "the Communists are endeavoring to accelerate the final collapse of capitalism predicted by Marx and Lenin," these retired U.S. generals trumpet in a single voice that their country should lead the entire capitalist world not in word but in deed, should subordinate the non-aligned nations to its influence, should improve Sino-American relations and marshal all anti-Soviet forces against the USSR. They are of the opinion that the United States should extend its "vitally important interests" not only to the entire American continent, Western Europe and the Atlantic, but also to Asia, the Near, Middle and Far East, to the Indian and Pacific oceans. In short, these retired generals openly attempt to defend the claims of the present Carter administration to the "U.S. leadership role in the world" and Washington's alleged right to impose its will in any region and in any country, employing various means to do so, including arms.

U.S. global foreign-policy objectives, which pursue the goal of establishing world dominance, can in the authors' opinion be achieved with observance of the following points: retention and further development of strategic nuclear potential as a decisive means of "deterring" the adversary; strengthening of the NATO bloc and deployment, together with U.S. allies, of additional general-purpose forces; attainment of military superiority over the socialist nations in the most important regions of the world; a hardening of policy in relations with the socialist countries.

It is proposed that development of strategic nuclear potential be effected by improving all three components, the so-called triad of strategic offensive forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, missile-carrying nuclear submarines, strategic bombers). Expressing the interests of the monopolist circles, the authors zealously defend the necessity of adoption of the B-1 strategic bomber and appeal to the president to reverse, before it is too late, his decision to cease production of this bomber. It is their opinion that this aircraft possesses enormous potential, attested by its high speed, multi-role designation, great range, and substantial firepower. Operating from U.S. bases, it is capable of delivering swift strikes anywhere in the world.

These militant retired generals propose that future U.S. strategy in the area of development of strategic offensive forces should consist in "under no circumstances making concessions to the Russians" in the course of strategic arms limitation talks and "mandatorily ensuring at least a qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear arms." In their opinion, the SALT I agreement, signed in 1972, is no longer in the U.S. "national" interest. Coming right out with war-mongering appeals, Zumwalt declares that if Washington wishes to retain a strategic nuclear potential as a means of "deterring" the adversary, it should repudiate at once the SALT I agreement, since it restrains further development of U.S. strategic forces and places the United States in a position where it allegedly is beginning to fall behind the Soviet Union in the area of nuclear might.

The fruitlessness of attempts by imperialism to settle the historic conflict with socialism in its own favor by means of force, including military force, has subsequently become obvious. The West was compelled to acknowledge the principles of peaceful coexistence as the only reasonable basis for relations with the socialist countries. In a joint Soviet-American communiqué signed in Vienna in July 1979, each party declared that it "does not seek and will not seek military superiority in the future, since this can lead only to dangerous instability, evoking a higher arms level and failing to promote the security of either party."

The present wave of anti-Soviet hysteria, however, which has seized Washington once again brings to the surface of U.S. militarist politics the authors of this book, who recommend gaining superiority in strategic weapons by any means possible.

The authors of the "grand strategy" are of the opinion that the development of general-purpose forces should also be subordinated to U.S. global foreign-policy goals. Taylor feels "a sense of deep concern over their present inadequacy." The authors explain that a policy of building up these forces is due to "an expanded magnitude of U.S. national policy tasks and increased opposition to their implementation, unrest in the world, and the increased possibility of participation by U.S. troops in numerous conflicts in various regions of the world, as well as the necessity of protecting lines of communication which link the United States to the

regions of the Western and Eastern hemispheres, and markets abroad, especially in Third World countries."

They propose maintaining ground forces approximately at the present numerical strength, but equipping them with sufficient quantities of modern military hardware and weapons. They recommend increasing the number of armored and mechanized units and combined units, creating conditions for mounting larger-scale airlifting of divisions and their organic weapons to various regions of the world, broadening the stockpiling of heavy equipment in potential theaters of war, and increasing the mobility of army aviation. "Strategic mobility of ground forces and overseas bases -- these are the decisive elements of future strategy."

They recommend that air forces (particularly tactical air forces) be trained primarily for performing the following missions: gaining air supremacy, close air support of ground forces, disruption of the enemy's lines of communication, etc. They propose a substantial increase in the combat readiness of air units, without altering the organizational structure of the Air Force, and they propose development of a long-range attack bomber and bringing the combat efficiency of Air National Guard and reserve units up to the level of the regular air forces.

In Zumwalt's opinion U.S. naval forces should be the world's largest and most powerful. As an expert, he proposes "commencing to build the fleet of the future": in place of existing heavy aircraft carriers, to have medium-displacement carriers (40-60 thousand tons) with conventional propulsion plants, adapted to handle VTOL/STOL aircraft; to build guided missile surface ships rapidly and in large numbers, ships capable of defeating the ships of the Soviet Navy. Of course in his opinion the United States should possess the most modern, powerful undersea fleet.

The authors propose building up general-purpose forces with an annual increase in appropriations for this purpose, as well as an increase in the military potential of the NATO bloc, Japan, Israel, reactionary Arab regimes, and certain other countries.

The "forward basing" system should comprise the foundation of the U.S. "grand strategy" for the 1980's. In the authors' opinion, military bases in all regions of the world are of decisive significance for attaining foreign-policy objectives. Clearly running through this book is the idea that "forces deployed in forward positions make it possible to display America's might in virtually any part of the world." For this reason the United States should not only keep existing bases but also acquire (seize) new bases in the South Atlantic, the Southwestern Pacific, in Africa, Asia, the Indian Ocean (especially in the Persian Gulf), and in the Near and Middle East. For reliable control and domination over various regions of the world, these retired generals demand that in case of necessity all NATO nation bases be placed fully under U.S. forces command, as well as strengthening Israel's military might, and holding at all costs U.S. bases in Spain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, in the Azores, Japan, South Korea, the

Philippines, Latin America, and in the Caribbean, including Cuba (Guantanamo Bay).

An important place is assigned to the NATO bloc in U.S. global strategy of the 1980's. The authors are of the opinion that the United States should pay the lion's share of the cost of strengthening NATO and at the same time should seek to obtain a greater contribution by the Western European countries. They propose that troop combat readiness be substantially increased, that mutual support and cooperation between forces be improved, with improvement in control, revision of operational deployment, joint planning in the area of weapons, and improved theater nuclear weapons employment plans.

Great importance is attached to strengthening the bloc's political unity. In Milton's opinion the United States, while remaining the leader and principal support of the North Atlantic Alliance, should always bear in mind the fact that when U.S. interests are threatened outside the NATO zone, NATO is not involved. And if a threat arises within the NATO zone, but only to the United States, the national interests of the other NATO member nations will immediately take precedence, and Washington must seek to achieve its objectives alone, without the participation of its allies and even without their passive cooperation. In connection with this, voicing distrust of U.S. NATO partners, Milton reminds the reader that the NATO nations "are not necessarily allies of the United States, with the exception of the area of their own defense." The author emphasizes that to fail to see the contradictions in NATO means "to be like an ostrich sticking its head in the sand." He therefore calls upon the U.S. Government to hold its allies "in its fist," to keep in readiness "some forces other than those which are part of NATO," and to extend the boundaries of "responsibility" of the North Atlantic Alliance. In this connection it is recommended that the threshold of employment of tactical nuclear weapons in the theater and in general be lowered, examining questions pertaining to employment of nuclear weapons, and that "moral considerations suitable for Sunday school sermons" be rejected. It is proposed that the NATO Joint Forces in Europe command elaborate more refined plans and different variants of employment of nuclear weapons.

Justifying the "necessity" for the United States to play a leader role in the world, the authors brazenly consider virtually all regions "a sphere of vitally important American interests." Europe is considered equally important strategically to the United States and is viewed as the most important region as regards ensuring the "security" of the capitalist system as a whole. In their opinion the loss of Europe would deal a devastating political, psychological, economic and military blow at the power and prestige of the United States and would irreversibly alter the balance of power to the detriment of the United States.

The authors state that the Near East will in the future acquire even greater strategic significance for the United States, in view of the

necessity of accomplishing two tasks: holding communism in check in order to preserve the requisite balance of power (main task); unhindered access to vast oil reserves, especially in the Persian Gulf; retaining U.S. control of this region as a "bridge between Eurasia and the African continent."

These retired generals make every attempt to substantiate the existence of important U.S. interests in the Indian and Pacific oceans, in Asia, in the Far East, and practically throughout the Western Hemisphere. All this is presented as "protecting U.S. security," although everybody knows, including the authors of this book, that nobody is planning to attack the United States. It follows from their arguments that the U.S. "security zone" should begin everywhere, at any point on earth and... end nowhere.

Retired General Palmer considers Africa to be an important region for the United States, since the "emotional interest of black Americans toward black Africa possesses great significance for America." He is forced to acknowledge, however, that "the United States has no vitally important interests in this region. Our (that is, American -- N. P.) present course of action -- which is essentially crude, naked political and economic meddling -- involves risk: in case of failure, as a minimum we shall be blamed, while at worst a bloody conflagration may erupt over a vast territory, which could cause direct military intervention by the United States.... Africa is a quagmire, and any U.S. military actions there will be not only many times more complex and difficult than in Vietnam but will end catastrophically for the United States." We believe that this is a very timely and correct warning to the present administration in Washington, which is preaching adventuristic "doctrines" of employment of military forces in international affairs.

All the military problems discussed in the book are presented by the authors from the position of U.S. ruling circles. Aggressive U.S. policy is carefully concealed in the guise of "love of peace," strategies of "deterrence" and "collective security," and deliberate distortion of Soviet foreign policy. An attempt is being made, contrary to reality, to show the inadequacy of the U.S. armed forces projected in the 1980's. According to Taylor's appraisal, their capabilities are not in conformity with the missions they may be assigned.

Concrete conclusions are drawn from all this on the necessity of arming in all areas, "continuously maintaining at least technical superiority over the Soviet Union."

If the views on military-political and military problems espoused in this book remained merely the "personal opinion" of these retired generals and admirals, as they attempt to suggest to the reader, this book could be ignored. However, many recommendations of these emissaries of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the Pentagon find expression today in the practical activities of the Carter Administration, which has whipped up crude anti-Soviet hysteria and has openly taken the path of revival of

the "cold war" atmosphere, intensification of the arms race and embarkation on dangerous adventures. Only a critical attitude toward the contents of the book "Grand Strategy for the 1980's" will enable one to gain a correct understanding of the aggressive trends of militant circles in Washington which it presents.

In the face of dangerous intrigues on the part of U.S. imperialism, which has drawn into the sphere of its militaristic preparations the other NATO countries and its Peking accomplices, Soviet military personnel must tirelessly increase their combat readiness, display a continuous high degree of vigilance and, together with the fighting men of the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations, reliably guard the great achievements of socialism and stand vigilant guard over world peace.

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NATO: SOVIET COMMENTS ON ITS ANTI-SOVIET POLICY

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[Article by Col V. Katerinich: "Anti-Sovietism -- Foundation of NATO Policy"]

[Text] The strategy of encirclement, subversion and destruction of the socialist world, and the Soviet Union in particular, has been throughout the entire postwar period and continues to be the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the United States and a number of other imperialist countries. Military-political blocs and alliances were created, military bases built, and the arms race initiated precisely for this reason. The NATO bloc is the principal grouping of imperialist nations aimed against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community.

Concealed in this policy are the causes of those fits of anti-Soviet and anticommunist hysteria which periodically shake NATO and poison the political climate throughout the world. A regular pattern has emerged: as soon as events occur which promote international détente, as soon as the Soviet Union advances new peace initiatives, militarist circles, the enemies of détente and good-neighbor relations between peoples, become immediately activated within NATO. They make every attempt to convince the public and armed forces personnel of the NATO countries of the necessity of further increasing the pace of the arms race and speeding up preparations for war.

The present campaign of militaristic poison and anti-Soviet propaganda has reached an unprecedented scope, especially since the SALT II Treaty was signed in Vienna and the question of the necessity of its ratification by the U.S. Congress arose. Frightened that this measure will serve the cause of deepening détente, political and military officials in the NATO countries, their yes-men from the powerful edifice of bourgeois mass information media, accompanied by the leaders in Peking, have charged into battle to rescue their aggressive plans and to increase military expenditures, which also signifies growth of the super-profits of the military-industrial complex.

Fits of militaristic psychosis in NATO are not new. The concocted fabrication of a "Soviet military threat" is always primarily utilized to whip up such a psychosis. Today, however, this myth has been transformed into the principal means of ideological deception of peoples, into a long-term political campaign against the Soviet Union and its peace-seeking foreign policy, and against the security of peoples. Trying to profit from this fiction, NATO leaders seek to break the resistance of the masses to their dangerous schemes, to attain a position of preponderance in the moral-political and ideological sphere of the struggle between the two opposing sociopolitical systems, and to prepare the general public and armed forces personnel for execution of military adventures.

The stepped-up anti-Soviet campaign in the NATO countries and their armed forces attests to the fact that this campaign is being conducted according to a thoroughly-prepared scenario, with not only its content but also forms, methods, time and intensity coordinated from a single headquarters. The purpose of this propaganda is to implant stereotypes of thinking in people's minds and to form in people false ideas about the countries of genuine socialism and their policies, on the true source of military threat, the essence of military preparations being carried out in NATO, the causes and character of the national liberation struggle of peoples, and on the class struggle of the toilers.

U.S. militarists display particular zeal, utilizing not only a vast official propagandist edifice but also those henchmen of the military-political complex, politicians and professional military who, in return for a sop from the corporations, devote all their time to whipping up anticommunism. The following in particular have engaged in such "activities": General Haig, former Supreme Commander of Joint NATO Forces in Europe; U.S. retired generals and admirals R. Stillwell, D. Graham, H. Moorer and E. Zumwalt; former Assistant Secretary of Defense P. Nitze; former U.S. secretaries of state D. Rusk and H. Kissinger; former CIA Deputy Director R. Kline; former Undersecretary of State W. Rostow, and others.

Many congressmen, journalists, Zionist leaders, and CIA-sponsored "scholars" employed in anti-Soviet organizations are also elaborating the ideological concepts of the extreme right wing of the militarist persuasion.

U.S. and NATO reactionary circles are alarmed not by the "aggressiveness" of the USSR, which they themselves have invented and which they do not believe. "We realize," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "that the deliberate aggravation of the international situation evoked by U.S. imperialism expresses its dissatisfaction with strengthening of the position of socialism, the growing momentum of the national liberation movement, and strengthening of those forces advocating détente and peace."

From the very establishment of the aggressive NATO bloc, its headquarters proceeded to draw up plans for waging war against the USSR and the other

nations of the socialist community (for example, operations "Charioteer" and "Drop Shot"). These plans were drawn up to the accompaniment of beating of the drums claiming a "Soviet military threat." And the fact that implementation of these plans has been hindered and impeded by the growing defense might of the Soviet Union and unification of all peace-loving forces evokes paroxysms of rage on the part of the imperialists, forces them to appraise the world balance of power in a realistic manner, and holds their aggressive schemes in check. Today many of them realize that any aggression could cost its instigators dearly.

Having achieved an approximate military parity with the United States in strategic arms, the USSR deprived the United States and NATO of the capability to dictate their will to other peoples "from a position of strength" and of resorting to international military brigandage and violence with impunity. Strengthening its defense in face of the military threat presented by imperialism, the Soviet Union performed a great deed, a genuine turning point in history, of inestimable significance for the future security of the peoples of the entire world.

Any step on the road toward détente is given a hostile reception by the aggressive circles representing the military-industrial complex. They fear for their enormous profits. And when profits are in question, monopoly capital will stop at nothing. Possessing enormous power and influence in the NATO countries, imperialist circles are seeking rebirth of a policy of intensifying the arms race and aggravating rivalry and confrontation. Numerous statements by U.S. President Carter attest to the fact that the imperialists would like to bring an end to détente, to provoke another "cold war" and increase potential to launch a devastating nuclear first strike. Hence their search for new aggressive concepts and doctrines, their counting on military force, and feverish militarist preparations.

Realizing that such a policy runs counter to the interests of the peoples of the entire world, the imperialists churn out various anti-Soviet fabrications and myths about an "imbalance of power," "need for additional armament," etc. They follow the old recipes of the notorious J. F. Dulles, who was preaching in the 1950's: "In order to force a country to bear the burden of maintaining powerful armed forces it is necessary to create an emotional atmosphere akin to the psychological atmosphere in time of war. It is necessary to instill the notion of an external threat."

Consequently the anti-Soviet hysteria in NATO and the ideological campaign directed at military personnel and the general public rest on a foundation of deliberate lies, fabrications, having nothing in common with reality. The imperialist propaganda edifice shuffles the facts, mixes truth with half-truth and fabrications, and substitutes slander for reality.

At the end of 1979, for example, the anti-Soviet psychosis in NATO was whipped up to a fever pitch under the patently-fabricated pretext of "shifting of the military balance of power in Europe by the Soviet Union to its own benefit." In fact nothing of the sort had occurred. What is

more, in order to prevent aggravation of the international situation, the Soviet Government, on the basis of an agreement with the government of the GDR, proceeded to withdraw from the territory of the GDR 20,000 military personnel and 1,000 tanks, and also declared its readiness to begin talks on reducing nuclear forces. The NATO leaders, however, have no interest in genuine ways to establish peace and security in Europe; what they need is a pretext to brainwash public opinion to pave the way for deployment of new weapons on the European continent, and they have artificially created such a pretext.

It is not surprising that the anti-Soviet lies of the NATO propagandists are at times refuted even by some NATO country politicians. For example, in an article published in the journal SURVIVAL, Klaas de-Vries, member of the Dutch Parliament, acknowledges that "the thesis of the weakness of NATO nuclear forces was unfortunately invented" and that "the image of a monster embodied by the SS-20 missiles (NATO classifications for Soviet missiles -- V. K.) was engendered for political motives." Other myths have also been invented in like manner, especially the myth that "the Russians are planning to attack soon" or that "the security of the West is threatened."

To speak of a military threat on the part of the Soviet Union is to state precisely the opposite of the truth. NATO leaders have decided to deploy in Europe new nuclear weapons not, as the official propaganda states, to "catch up with the USSR" but because, in Kissinger's opinion, this will give the West a "trump card against the Russians," "will link the governments of all the NATO countries by a unified strategy," and will increase U.S. capability "to undertake unilateral actions." It could not be stated more clearly.

There is reason for the fact that anti-Soviet hysteria in NATO is persistently linked with the sermon of war and violence. "We must secure sufficient strength to fight and win," proclaims General Rogers, who only recently assumed the post of Supreme Commander of NATO Joint Forces in Europe.

Recently the United States, the FRG, Great Britain and other NATO countries have been playing out scenarios of military operations and drawing up predictions of a third world war. War is presented by them as something inevitable. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations are invariably cast in the role of aggressor.

Since 1978 a book entitled "World War III, August 1985" by Retired British General Hackett has enjoyed brisk sales in the West. At one time he commanded the British Army of the Rhine and served at the same time as commanding general of NATO's Northern Army Group. As an expert on NATO affairs, he refers in the book to plans drafted by bloc headquarters, while as author of a "work of fiction," he piles up mountains of slander against the Soviet Union and its peace-seeking policy, evidently considering himself

to be free of any responsibility for truthfulness and authenticity of facts. The book contains an appeal to employ nuclear weapons against the USSR.

In the armed forces such an anti-Soviet campaign takes the form of outright preparations to wage combat operations against the Soviet Union. The November issue of the U.S. military magazine MARINE CORPS GAZETTE stated that a special program to study the "nature of the threat" has been introduced for the U.S. Marines. In this connection the magazine states: "Every Marine should know the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviets. He should study Soviet doctrine and be capable of utilizing his knowledge in the struggle to achieve the principal objective -- victory in battle."

Similar programs exist in the armed forces of the majority of NATO member nations.

NATO propaganda pertaining to USSR domestic policy and Soviet realities is also nothing but pure slander and defamation. The imperialists fear that military personnel and the toilers of the NATO countries will learn the truth about genuine socialism and that this will affect their attitudes and end political ignorance. This is why they so assiduously slander the life of the Soviet people, their success in building communism, and they attempt to present in a distorted light the rights of Soviet citizens which are formally stated in the USSR Constitution.

The imperialist bourgeoisie has long utilized shameless anticommunism to settle accounts with progressive forces and those who protest merciless exploitation and lack of rights. Anybody suspected of sympathy for the Soviet Union is subjected to persecution and declared to be a "subversive element." Thus anti-Sovietism and inciting to war against the Soviet Union and other socialist nations also are an attempt to strengthen capitalism and to whitewash that crisis-crippled system, with all ensuing consequences for the toilers. They disseminate all kinds of fabrications about the "advantages" and "democratization" of contemporary capitalism, about the "establishment of class peace," about "equal opportunities" and other such concocted fabrications, which have nothing in common with reality but which bind people to the capitalist system and promote preservation of the power of monopoly capital.

Anti-Sovietism is also utilized in NATO for psychologically preparing armed forces personnel for aggressive actions against countries which have become liberated. In conformity with the global strategy of imperialism, NATO military-political leaders are attempting to isolate the national liberation movement from the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, to deprive them of aid and support by the socialist countries, and thus maximally to weaken them and to make them an easy prey for the imperialist aggressors and neocolonialists.

Military personnel in NATO countries are constantly taught that it is the "sacred right" of the United States and the other members of the bloc to

enjoy unimpeded access to the riches of other countries and to utilize these riches as they see fit. E. Zumwalt, for example, considers the African continent south of the Sahara and the entire southern part of the Atlantic Ocean an American fiefdom. T. Milton asserts that military might alone will enable the West to cope with "future troubles" connected with shortages of raw materials. In his opinion employment of force is simply inevitable "for specific and limited goals," such as to "punish" those developing countries which "will refuse" to supply raw materials and other goods.

The United States Government comes right out and declares various regions of the world to be "spheres of vitally important U.S. interests." A tendency to shift these spheres closer to the borders of the Soviet Union and to lay claim to the natural resources of others, including the oil-producing regions of the Near and Middle East, has been increasingly evident for some time now. Ideas of U.S. hegemonism are being pushed with increasing persistence, ideas garbed in the form of demagogic statements on the need for the United States "to pay any price to remain the world's mightiest nation," about a certain "global responsibility" of U.S. imperialism, its "leadership role in the world," "civilizing mission," etc. All these theses are aimed directly against the Soviet Union.

Anti-Sovietism also forms the basis of propaganda aimed at igniting chauvinistic attitudes among NATO military personnel and the general public and is leading to strengthening of "hawkish," aggressive trends and to the growth of militarism.

NATO propagandists are quite willing to play on the aspiration of peoples for peace and to sell the aggressive NATO bloc as an instrument of peace and security of peoples, which is allegedly "holding Soviet aggression in check." NATO militarists are constantly claiming to be advocates of détente, and yet in actual fact they make every effort to hinder measures to deepen peace, attempt to undermine it and transform all talks and negotiations into idle chatter, the sole purpose of which is to deceive peoples in regard to the reasons for the increasing complexity of the international situation and mutual relations with socialist countries. And these are not simply tactical devices but rather a strategy which began in 1950, at the very beginning of the existence of NATO.

Precisely at that time former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze advanced the thesis that talks with the USSR should be viewed not as a means of settling disputes or achieving détente but as a step on the road to "victory." "We should," preached Nitze, "hold talks with the Russians because public opinion demands it, but we should manipulate talks in such a manner that the public believes that with Moscow our only possible action is to build up our might, amassing greater and greater forces." Thus for militarists talks are merely a means of stepping up the arms race.

In full conformity with these views, present NATO leaders advise holding a dialogue with the Soviet Union only "from a position of strength." Thus any talks are doomed to failure in advance, since it is obvious that they

presuppose equality of the parties and their rights, not dictate by one party. Military and political leaders of the United States and certain other NATO member nations apparently cannot rid themselves of an imperial, hegemonist way of thinking and do not want to recognize the existing balance of power in the international arena.

In recent years ultrarightist, fascist and neofascist organizations have also begun to be extensively utilized in NATO to whip up anti-Soviet and anticommunist hysteria. In the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy such organizations have been transformed into bearers and disseminators of the ideas of militarism, revanchism and violence, frantic hatred toward the forces of progress, and especially the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say that in the FRG, for example, there are 44 ultrarightist publishing houses in operation, turning out as many as 10 million copies of fascist books and pamphlets.

The reason for such an abundant literature on Hitler, Hitler's generals and the German Wehrmacht, which is characteristic, incidentally, not only of the FRG but also of other NATO countries, was quite frankly stated by the reactionary West German newspaper DEUTSCHE NATIONALZEITUNG: "The struggle against communism today cannot be convincing without due recognition of the services of those who fought with weapon in hand against communism yesterday."

China's ruling clique is also playing a shameful role in fanning the flames of anti-Sovietism and encouraging tension. Blinded by shameless nationalism, Peking's leaders, pursuing provocational aims, not only slavishly repeat the theses of official NATO propaganda but themselves pour oil on the fire. At times they go further in their zeal than their NATO friends. Peking inalterably links the myth of a "Soviet threat" with its insane theories on the inevitability of a third world war.

The professionalism and sophistication of the NATO propagandist edifice on the one hand and the narrow political outlook and ignorance of many military personnel and certain segments of the general public in the NATO member countries on the other lead to a situation where the influence of aggressive anti-Soviets and anticommunists, who are counting on aggression and war, is fairly strong. Numerous public opinion surveys conducted in NATO countries show that many people are captive to militarist ideology.

At the same time the split between the two opposing poles, representing peace and war, is continuing to deepen in public opinion in the countries of the West. There is taking place a steady redistribution of forces, and not to the advantage of the anti-Soviet militarists. Many military personnel and civilians in the NATO countries realize the great danger of the plans of militarist circles and find in constructive Soviet proposals a realistic way to secure peace in Europe and throughout the world. This is causing considerable concern to NATO leaders. The magazine NATO'S 15 NATIONS complained in a special issue dedicated to the 30th anniversary

of the North Atlantic Alliance: "The weakness of the North Atlantic Alliance is its morale and lack of support among the youth of Europe and North America." This phenomenon is symptomatic. Peoples are rejecting war and stepping up the campaign for peace, realizing that militarism will not retreat on its own, that it must be met with resistance across the board, exposing the spiritual poison with which it conceals preparations for new military adventures.

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FIELD ARTILLERY: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 pp 27-32

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Col V. Kalashnikov: "Views on Employment of Field Artillery in the U.S. Army"]

[Excerpt] The U.S. Army, preparing its troops to wage combat operations with the employment both of nuclear and conventional weapons, devotes considerable attention to increasing the firepower of combined units and units by developing new and updating existing artillery systems. A special role is assigned to field artillery and improving the tactics of its combat employment.

U.S. field manuals emphasize that the division field artillery system is designated for organization and conduct of fire to support units and subunits. When necessary it is supplemented by combat subunit mortar fire, tactical airstrikes, and other weapons. It is also noted that division field artillery should provide direct and continuous firepower support of units and subunits day and night, year-round, and in all terrain. According to the field manuals, the field artillery system contains the following functional elements: artillery weapons and ammunition, target reconnaissance, fire planning and control, and delivery of fire.

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AVIATION: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO LOW-ALTITUDE TACTICS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 pp 43-49

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Kirillov: "Low-Level Attack"]

[Excerpt] In the opinion of foreign military experts, the attack is the most intense and critical stage of a combat mission, a stage for which they state such basic requirements as swiftness and accuracy. Swiftness is characterized by the sudden appearance of an aircraft in the vicinity of the target and rapidity of closing with the target, making it impossible for the adversary to take effective defensive measures. Accuracy determines attainment of the principal objective of the attack -- destruction or neutralization of the specified target with minimum forces. They are of the opinion that under present-day conditions the most acceptable attack technique in tactics of fighter-bombers and ground-attack aircraft providing close air support of ground troops is the low-level attack on a ground target (at the greatest possible airspeed), which will produce a number of tactical advantages. In particular, it will reduce aircraft vulnerability (increase aircrew survivability), and will thus increase probability of scoring an effective hit on the target.

Certain figures are cited in the foreign press to back up this thesis. It is noted, for example, that ground radars detect an aircraft flying at a height of below 100 meters, and hugging the terrain, at ranges of not more than 10-12 km. Traveling at a speed of 250 m/s (900 km/h), an aircraft will cover this distance in approximately 1 minute, a time clearly insufficient for the enemy to ready antiaircraft weapons and to deliver effective fire (fire missiles). According to the calculations of Western experts, with an aircraft flying above European flatland terrain, a decrease in height from 150 to 60 meters reduces range of detection by ground optical means from 9.6 to 3.2 km. A speed of Mach 2 is required in order to ensure full aircraft invulnerability at a height of 150 meters, while at a height of 60 meters speed can be reduced to 1,100 km/h. At the same time high speeds make it difficult to spot the target.

Proceeding from the above, foreign experts are of the opinion that low altitudes and optimal speeds, as well as concealment against the terrain background, and utilization of screening angles ("blind zones" in the enemy's enemy's radar coverage) will ensure adequate concealment of flight, and consequently the element of surprise in attacking specified ground tragets.

The majority of regulations and manuals dealing with combat employment of U.S. tactical aviation and that of other members of the aggressive bloc state that the attack begins at the moment an aircraft reaches the point of airborne weapons effective fire. In low-level operations, however, entry into the potential attack area often coincides with the moment of target detection. Many air force experts of these countries divide the final segment of the mission, connected with execution of the attack, into the following stages: detection, target identification, combat maneuver, aiming, and weapons delivery.

Their views on the specific features of execution of each of these stages are presented below.

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AVIATION: COMMENTS ON BASING OF U.S. B-52 BOMBERS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 pp 49-51

[Article by Col I. Karenin: "U.S. B-52 Bombers Over Europe"]

[Text] In response to peace initiatives by the Soviet Union, aimed at mutual reduction of forces and arms in Central Europe, the United States is continuing to beef up its air forces in this region, under the hackneyed slogan of an alleged "Soviet threat."

Judging from reports in the foreign press, the Pentagon intends to allocate from the U.S. Strategic Air Command 80 B-52D strategic bombers for the conduct of combat operations in support of ground and naval forces from forward air bases located on the territory of certain European countries which are members of the aggressive NATO bloc. In the opinion of U.S. strategists, implementation of this plan will make it possible to increase by almost 50 percent the striking power of the bloc's air forces in Europe with the employment of conventional weapons.

The first such base is slated to be prepared in the next two years at Marham air station (England). The B-52D aircraft base at this facility will have the mission, according to the U.S. Air Force plan, of supporting combat operations of joint NATO forces in the Central European Theater by delivery of airstrikes with conventional ordnance, chiefly aircraft bombs (each B-52D bomber is capable of delivering 20-30 tons of bombs onto the target in a single sortie, see figure [figure omitted]). While focusing the Western reader's attention on such a "humane" mission, the foreign press does not conceal another capability of the B-52D, namely to carry nuclear weapons. In addition, this is considered a possibility for strengthening the nuclear forces of the NATO bloc in this theater.

The foreign press reports some details of the plan of organization of logistical support of B-52D bombers at forward air bases. In particular, it is planned to stockpile fuel at these bases, to deploy aircraft bomb storage facilities, and to concentrate the requisite ground equipment for maintenance and preflighting of B-52D aircraft. It is also planned to

increase the number of KC-135 aerial tankers based on the territory of NATO member nations; these tankers will support the combat operations of the B-52D bombers.

Work on problems of coordination between bombers, ground troops and naval forces began in the course of exercises conducted in 1979. In particular, in October of that year three B-52D bombers and some personnel of the U.S. Strategic Air Command 7th Bomber Wing took part in the "Autumn Forge" annual exercises of the NATO Joint Forces. Operating from Marham air station, these aircraft flew at high altitudes above the territory of the FRG. The aircrews simulated bombing runs on selected targets (bombing accuracy was determined with the aid of an airborne radar).

That same month B-52D aircraft took part in another NATO exercise -- "Ocean Safari," held in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea. Their principal mission was to destroy "aggressor" surface ships.

In these exercises the U.S. Strategic Air Command worked on problems of organization of maintenance and readying the B-52D for missions at forward bases. It was reported that only one Military Airlift Command C-141 aircraft was required to transport various ground equipment and other supplies from the United States, since the bulk of the supplies were carried in the bomb bays of the combat aircraft, while the bombs (together with bomb racks) were already prepared for mounting at airfields located in several European countries.

U.S. Air Force officials believe that SAC can assign a large number of B-52 strategic bombers to reinforce NATO air forces in Europe even if the allies refuse to deploy forward air bases or if they cannot be utilized. The Strategic Air Command believes that B-52 bombers are capable of striking targets in Europe from airfields located in the United States, especially with mid-air refueling. In order to work on this version of conduct of combat operations, plans call for flying B-52 bombers from the United States (with mid-air refueling) during the next large-scale NATO exercise in Europe. Several KC-135 aerial tankers are to be temporarily deployed to Keflavik Air Force Base (Iceland) for this purpose.

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NAVAL AVIATION: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 pp 59-63

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) R. Dmitriyev: "U.S. Navy Carrier and Shore-Based Aviation"]

[Excerpt] U.S. naval aviation, which totals approximately 6,300 combat, transport, training and other fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, constitutes one of the most important means of carrying out the aggressive schemes of U.S. ruling circles. As is emphasized in the U.S. press, it is assigned the following missions: to deliver missile and bomb attacks (including nuclear) on enemy ships, naval bases and other installations; to take part in gaining and holding control of the sea and air supremacy; engaging in submarine search operations in designated areas, patrolling on ASW lines, and antisubmarine defense of task forces and convoys; providing air cover to task forces, amphibious forces and convoys en route; providing air support to amphibious assault forces while moving ashore and operations on shore, as well as to ground troops on coastal axes; conduct of reconnaissance in sea and ocean theaters and in coastal waters; performance of blockade operations aimed at denying hostile naval forces egress to the open sea.

U.S. naval aviation is divided into fleet aviation (carrier-based and shore-based) and Marine aviation. In this article the author will examine the fighting strength, organization, deployment and performance characteristics of embarked and shore-based fixed-wing and rotary-wing combat aircraft.

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NAVAL BASES: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. PROTECTIVE SYSTEM

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 pp 63-66

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Mosalev: "U.S. Naval Base Security"]

[Excerpt] Protection of U.S. naval bases and ports, it is reported in the U.S. press, is provided with the aid of diversified forces and various technical means. ASW forces, Marine and army subunits, as well as warships stationed or temporarily located at a naval base but not under the base commander, may also be enlisted to protect a naval base.

According to information in the foreign press, the following equipment and facilities (see figure [figure omitted]) are utilized for naval base protection, dispositioned in depth in far and close-in zones, as well as directly in the harbor:

in the far zone (30-80 km from the base) -- shore-based ASW helicopters, frigates and small ASW ships;

in the close-in zone (up to 30 km) -- special shore radars, a passive sonobuoy system, electromagnetic indicator loops, electron-optical and visual means of detection, and ships (patrol ships, mine hunters, minesweepers);

directly by the base entrance -- electromagnetic indicator loops, harbor booms, active sonobuoy systems, patrol boats, mine hunters, and in the harbor itself -- active 360 degree Doppler and scanning sonar systems, high-resolution shore radars, electron-optical and visual water surface surveillance devices, and mine hunters; combat swimmers also take part in security activities.

The foreign press reports that the following are employed for protection of individual large warships and important hydraulic engineering structures: such individual devices as anti-torpedo and anti-sabotage (barrier and warning) nets, portable active Doppler sonar systems, underwater laser and television equipment, the ship's boats and floats, as well as divers and frogmen.

Various security warning systems are installated on naval base docks and shore areas, employing radar, low light level television, seismic, acoustic, magnetic, electromagnetic, infrared, vibration, gradiometric, contact and combined sensors, and various fences, including fences with electronic warning systems indicating penetration or fence damage. Security forces include guard posts, patrols, and guard dogs.

The shore in the vicinity of naval bases is protected with the aid of shore stationary, mobile and portable radars, shore stationary sonar systems, and security warning devices with seismic, acoustic, magnetic, electromagnetic, infrared and combined sensors. Also employed are vehicle and foot patrols with vehicle-carried and personnel-carried radar, night vision devices, and dogs.

A shore headquarters, which is connected by cable and radio relay communication links with stationary posts and by radio with mobile forces, manages and controls naval base security forces and facilities.

Organization of protection and security activities and makeup of enlisted forces and facilities are determined by the importance of the base, distance from the adversary, degree of threat by the adversary, concrete physical-geographic, meteorological and hydrologic features of the base area, as well as availability of personnel and equipment which can be utilized for these purposes.

The above-listed means can be employed in combined mobile or stationary systems.

Mobile systems consist of four standard containers (measuring 3.6 x 2.1 x 2.1 m, weighing 544 kg, 1,587 kg loaded), each of which can be carried by a 2.5 ton truck, trailer, fixed-wing or rotary-wing transport aircraft. This system includes an underwater detection post, surface detection and surveillance equipment post, communications center, and supply container. Underwater equipment includes a PADD buoy Doppler system for detecting small moving underwater targets,* while surface equipment includes an AN/TPS-31 detection radar, which has a high resolution for small targets, plus night vision devices and a searchlight. All containers are equipped with AN/TSC-22 communications gear.

Stationary systems, which are set up taking into account the specific features of seafloor topography on approaches to the naval base and shoreline configurations, provide disposition in depth of various equipment for detecting and tracking vehicles bringing into the area and landing reconnaissance-sabotage parties and individual combat swimmers moving under water and on the surface with the aid of swim fins.

Equipment can include various sonar, radar, electron-optical and magnetometric detection devices.

* For more detail see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, 1979, pp 77-78 -- Ed.

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MILITARY JOURNAL: READERS' EVALUATION

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 7 May 80 p 80

[Unattributed article: "Journal Editors Visit Men of Kiev Military District"]

[Text] In March of this year staff personnel from the journal ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE held a number of reader conferences and get-togethers in the Red-Banner Kiev Military District, organized by the district political directorate. Journal representatives discussed the work of the journal staff, reported on plans for the immediate future, and replied to reader questions.

In statements made at the conferences and in personal conversations, district officers and general officers commented that the journal enjoys popularity among all categories of military personnel and promotes indoctrination of Soviet fighting men in a spirit of dedication to the cause of the CPSU and the socialist homeland, maintaining constant political vigilance and a high degree of combat readiness, and renders concrete assistance in studying the armed forces of foreign countries.

Readers gave high marks to a number of articles which have recently appeared in various sections of the journal. Considerable interest was aroused by businesslike, concrete suggestions aimed at further improving the journal and increasing flexibility of publications. All reader suggestions will be carefully studied and implemented when possible.

The journal staff and editors would like to express sincere thanks to those who organized and participated in the conferences, especially to comrades A. K. Kozlov, G. G. Skovorodko, D. N. Yeramalenko, G. A. Golovin, N. F. Shkoda, A. M. Karavayev, V. D. Dmitriyenko, A. N. Minkin, and A. A. Rogach.

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POLITICAL TRAINING: ARMED DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 80 signed to press 20 May 80 pp 17-27

[Article* by Col M. Pletushkov, candidate of historical sciences, docent: "The CPSU's Experience in Organizing the Defense of Socialism, Experience of Worldwide Historical Importance"]

[Text] To the Soviet people has fallen the historical role of the trailblazer, of the pioneer in laying out the new path of social development. This has required special efforts on their part and an unceasing surge for forms and methods by which to build and defend the new society, and these have had to be tested in the crucible of life. And if our people have passed all the tests with honor, this is primarily due to the enormous job performed by the Communist Party, created and developed by the great Lenin.

In the struggle for the proletarian revolution, for socialism and communism, the CPSU has accumulated extremely valuable know-how, not specifically national but of prominent international importance. Noting that our party's experience "has gone down in history as the achievement of socialism," V.I. Lenin expressed his firm certainty that "the future international revolution will build its socialist structure on this experience" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 383).

All the forces of the old world took up arms against the first workers' state. Matters of organizing the armed defense of the revolutionary conquests and of the socialist homeland have therefore occupied a special place in the CPSU's historical experience. The value and the universal importance of our party's military experience for the international communist movement and for all revolutionary forces of modern times are due to the fact that it reflects the objective laws of the new era, the era of

* This article is recommended for use in officers' Marxist-Leninist training groups during their study of the subject "The International Importance of the CPSU's Historical Experience in the Building of Socialism and the Organization of its Armed Defense."

man's transition from capitalism to socialism, and indicates a ready-tested way to resolve the extremely complex problems involved in socialist military organizational development.

The history of the CPSU is a process of Marxism-Leninism in action. In their military work V. I. Lenin and the party relied primarily upon the theoretical heritage left by the founders of scientific communism.

K. Marx and F. Engels arrived at the natural way to defend a state of a victorious proletariat by analyzing the objective laws underlying the development of the capitalist society, among which the law of employment of force in the class conflict between antagonistic forces plays a considerable role. In their very first works they pointed out that armed terrorism by internal and external counterrevolution would inevitably force the proletariat to defend their revolutionary dictatorship by military means. The experience of participants in the Paris Commune confirmed the correctness of this scientific foresight. "If the Paris Commune had not relied upon the influence of the people armed against the bourgeoisie," F. Engels wrote, "would it actually have lasted more than a single day? And do we not have the right, on the other hand, to criticize the Commune for the fact that it made too little use of this influence?" (K. Marx and F. Engels. "Soch." [Works], Vol 18, p 305).

In the era of imperialism new prospects opened up for the development of proletarian revolutions, and realistic possibilities for their triumphant completion. Considering the nature of that era and its peculiarities V. I. Lenin took a new approach to the problem of defending socialist homelands. He pointed out that socialism's victory, initially in one nation or in several nations at once, would inevitably produce "an immediate attempt by the bourgeoisie of other nations to destroy the socialist state's victorious proletariat" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 133). Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, V. I. Lenin linked the continued development of the world socialist revolution with the consolidation of the Soviet state, with its ability to hold out while encircled by a hostile capitalism. He underscored the fact that as more and more nations fell away from the imperialist system there would be a fierce struggle against counterrevolutionary forces right up to the point of socialism's complete triumph on a worldwide scale.

History has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's conclusions and prognoses. The Soviet nation was forced to spend almost two decades of its existence engaged in wars launched against it by imperialism and on the subsequent restoration of its national economy. The Leninist Communist Party provided the inspiration and functioned as the organizer of the victories achieved by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. It incorporated the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the defense of socialism and enriched that doctrine with new theoretical tenets.

In today's situation the CPSU regards protecting the socialist homeland, strengthening the USSR's defense capability and building up the Soviet Armed Forces as its sacred duty, as a cause for all the people and one of the most important functions of the socialist state. This program principle, based upon a scientific analysis of the characteristics of international development, was specifically stated in materials of the 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and decrees passed by plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and in the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party leaders. The Leninist concept of protecting the socialist homeland is legally outlined in the Constitution of the USSR.

The laws underlying the defense of socialism's conquests are in many respects manifested differently in the contemporary situation. First of all, we need to emphasize the fact that socialism has now become a world system. It is expanding in breadth and depth and having an enormous influence upon the course of the world revolutionary process. Imperialism, on the other hand, has once and for all lost the historical initiative, suffered irreplaceable losses and been deprived of the possibility of arranging the fates of peoples unimpeded.

It is now necessary to defend the socialist conquests in a situation of global confrontation between the two social systems and of increased aggression on the part of reactionary forces. "The positive changes taking place in the world," states the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," "are encountering fierce resistance on the part of imperialist reaction. Militaristic and reactionary circles are stepping up their attacks upon detente, attempting to alter the balance of power in their favor, building up the arms race and attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations and to suppress the popular liberation movements."

American imperialism is the main bulwark of international reaction. Reactionary groups in the United States have never concealed their claims to world hegemony, but in recent years their imperious manners have been manifested increasingly openly and assertively. "We have the opportunity," President Carter has announced, "to play a leading role in the world, and this leading role places responsibility upon us at many different levels..." This "philosophy," which reflects the interests of the military-industrial complex, is based upon the cynical principle that what is necessary or is considered necessary for the United States must be accepted as positive by all nations and that American military might, economic pressure, ideological subversion and so forth will be applied against those which do not agree.

Nor can the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth disregard the military preparations and plots of the aggressive forces. The CPSU and the Soviet state oppose the imperialist "doctrine" of military hysteria and furious pursuit of the arms race with a policy of consistent struggle for peace and security of nations. At the same time

they concern themselves constantly with improving the nation's defensive strength and insuring that no one risks disturbing our peaceful life.

Experience has graphically demonstrated the fact that the socialist state's military organization has the crucial role in insuring its security. Analyzing the struggle waged by the young Soviet republic against its enemies from within and without, V. I. Lenin made the following statement: "Without armed protection of the socialist republic we could not exist" (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 138). He went on to say: "...if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to rule and if it is to rule, it must demonstrate this with its military organization as well" (Ibid., p 139).

Prior to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and during the first months of Soviet power, V. I. Lenin and the party adhered to the concept of universal armament of the workers, which was realized in the creation of the Red Guard. It suppressed the resistance of the overthrown landowners and capitalists without any special difficulty. It soon became apparent, however, that the young Soviet republic's small, poorly armed and poorly trained volunteer units and militia formations were not capable of operating successfully against the combined military forces of foreign interventionists and internal counterrevolution. Life itself thus brought out the need for a mass, regular, technically equipped army capable of reliably defending the conquests of the revolution.

The party took the practical steps to create such an army on the basis of the social-political and organizational principles of military development worked out by V. I. Lenin. These principles include the following: party leadership of the Armed Forces, a class composition of the forces, unity of the army and the people, conformity of forms of military organization to specific historical conditions, sole command on a party basis, aware military discipline, and other principles which fundamentally distinguish the socialist army from the army of any bourgeois state.

The Leninist principles of military organizational development and the practical experience of the CPSU in creating and building up the new type of army represent an extremely valuable contribution to the repository of Marxism-Leninism. With allowances for certain national historical factors they are employed by fraternal parties in deciding matters of defense.

The class principle is one of the most important in the organizational development of socialist armies. It essentially consists in insuring that the nature and the purpose of the army conform strictly and totally to the nature of the new social and state structure and to the goals of the struggle waged by the working class and by all workers for socialism and communism. The substance of this principle is expressed in Lenin's words: "Ours is a class army, in contrast to that of the bourgeoisie" (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 43, p 230).

The cadre principle is employed in common by the socialist states for creating their armed forces. The existence in certain nations of separate militia formations (territorial defense units and subunits were created in the Polish People's Republic, for example, and the People's Army of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has territorial troops along with regular forces) does not change the overall situation, because the main nucleus of the armed forces there is comprised of regular, cadre units and formations.

Military development principles such as centralization of leadership, sole command and aware military discipline are also common to the socialist armies. The principle of centralism means the subordination of all army formations to the state's agencies of authority and to a single supreme command. Sole command in the socialist nations' armies is exercised on a party basis. Military discipline is not based upon class supremacy or force as in the bourgeois armies, but upon the sharing of goals and tasks by commanders and their subordinates in insuring the socialist homeland's security and upon the political awareness of the serviceman.

The communist and workers' parties of the socialist commonwealth show great concern for indoctrinating the officer cadres and for improving their ideological-theoretical and military-professional training. A system of higher and secondary military educational institutions has been created in all the commonwealth nations, from whose walls emerge highly trained commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians loyal to the cause of communism. The Soviet Union continues to provide fraternal nations with necessary assistance in the training of officer cadres.

Following the example of the Soviet Armed Forces all the socialist armies devote serious attention to party-political work, which is conducted by commanders, political organs and party organizations. This work is directed toward the successful accomplishment of combat and political training tasks and toward indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism, of combat fraternity with all the allied armies.

It should also be noted that Leninist principles and Soviet know-how in military organizational development were successfully employed in China as well, especially during the first years following the victory of the popular revolution. Speaking at the eighth CCP Congress in 1956, Marshal Peng Dehuai, then minister of defense of the PRC, stated: "The demand for complete mastery of all the Soviet Army's advanced know-how, set by us at the very beginning of the development of our modern army, is a proper one. Within a few years we have achieved great success in the study of the Soviet Army's know-how. There is absolutely no doubt as to the fact that our training must continue to focus mainly upon the study of the Soviet Army's advanced know-how, because it is the most progressive revolutionary army today. Its military science is the very best, its military equipment is first-rate and it possesses a rich body of experience in directing the modern army's military operations."

Later, however, after advancing their "special," nationalistic course, China's Maoist leadership altered the army's political aspect and turned it into a tool of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, into a means of realizing hegemonistic, chauvinistic ambitions.

The historical experience of the CPSU has convincingly demonstrated the fact that a truly socialist type of army can only be created under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party. Party leadership of the socialist state's military policy is the source of its effectiveness. "The party," said M. V. Frunze, "has performed and will continue to perform the leading role throughout our military policy. Without this being done by the party we cannot conceive of strengthening our nation's military might or of increasing the strength, the internal cohesion, the solidarity and the discipline of our Red Army" ("Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 224).

It is certainly for a reason that bourgeois ideologists distort the meaning and the nature of the CPSU's leading role in Soviet society and are especially zealous in falsifying this role in the area of military organizational development. It is a favorite device of all kinds of "Sovietologists," among other things, to attempt to contrast the Communist Party with the Soviet state. Such juxtapositioning has absolutely no basis, however. While defining society's general, long-term development and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy line and directing the creative work of the Soviet people, the party also oversees all aspects of the common, national job of protecting the homeland. It brings up military-political problems at the right time, works them out in theory, formulates the practical tasks and coordinates the efforts of state agencies and institutions, mass public organizations and all workers aimed at insuring the nation's security. Direct supervision of the process of military organizational development remains the prerogative of the legislative and executive agencies of state power. The Constitution of the USSR defines the authority of these agencies in matters of war and peace, in organizing the nation's defense and directing the Armed Forces.

The entire history of the Soviet state and its victories of worldwide historical importance achieved in battles with its enemies have clearly and convincingly demonstrated the fact that only a Marxist-Leninist party is capable of performing the creation, the development and the all-round strengthening of a socialist military organization. The principle of party leadership of the socialist state's Armed Forces is still valid today. It is reflected in the CPSU Program and in the program documents of the fraternal parties of other socialist commonwealth nations.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that peoples setting out on a path of socialist development must have a close military and economic alliance, that protecting the new system is in essence an international matter. "Anyone who takes a casual attitude toward the defense of a nation in which the

proletariat has already achieved victory," Vladimir Il'ich stressed, "is destroying the bond with international socialism" (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 292).

History has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's opinion on the international nature of the defense of socialism's conquests. Attempts by imperialist forces to break the will of this or that people choosing the path of socialist development have failed more than once. And the international class solidarity of the workers has played an important role.

On the other hand, there have also been cases in which a revolution has not achieved its goal but has suffered defeat in great part because the international proletariat was not able to provide it with prompt and sufficiently effective assistance. Graphic examples of this were the fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic in 1918 and the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919.

Our nation has rigorously fulfilled its international duty and continues to do so. This was so during the years of civil war, when it did everything possible to support the revolutionary movements of the working class in a number of nations. It was also the case during the subsequent years of peaceful socialist construction, when more than once it provided various forms of economic political and military assistance to peoples subjected to imperialist aggression. In 1921 Red Army units helped the Mongolian people to rout the gangs of White Guard generals and Chinese imperialists, and to repel an invasion by Japanese aggressors in 1939. In the 1930's more than 3,000 Soviet volunteers fought in Republican Spain, and nearly 4,000 in China.

The Soviet people demonstrated unshakable loyalty to their internationalist duty during World War II. Under Communist Party leadership our valorous Armed Forces dealt a crushing defeat to Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, defended the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland and performed a great liberation mission. The Soviet Nation became the main force blocking German fascism's way to world domination, bore the brunt of the war and performed the decisive role in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and then of militaristic Japan.

The falsifiers of history would like to erase this feat from the peoples' memory. They are still attempting to downgrade the role played by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the liberation of peoples from the bonds of fascism. Despite all their conjectures, however, they will not be able to nullify the noble mission performed by the Soviet people and their army. As they liberated their native land from the occupiers and crossed over the borders into foreign countries the Soviet Armed Forces bore the lofty principles of proletarian international on their standards.

The international tasks of the Soviet Nation and its Armed Forces have grown since the war, in the new historical situation. And the most important of these tasks is that of protecting real socialism. Reality has demonstrated the fact that the Soviet people, guided by the Leninist party, are performing their obligations with respect to protecting the conquests of socialism in a worthy manner. There has never been an instance in history in which our nation has not come to the aid of its friends and allies when they were subjected to aggression. The Soviet people are fully entitled proudly to repeat V. I. Lenin's words today: "We have not betrayed anyone or anything... not refused to help a single friend or comrade in trouble in any way we could, with everything at our disposal" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 80).

A basic characteristic of socialism's defense today lies in the fact that it is performed by the joint efforts of the socialist commonwealth nations. The Warsaw Pact Organization has reliably served the cause of peace and socialism for a quarter of a century now. The creation and buildup of this defensive alliance was an important step in the development and the practical realization of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on defending the socialist homeland.

Bourgeois and revisionist ideologists stubbornly assert that NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as military-political alliances, are somehow equally to blame for increasing international tensions and for the arms race. This is a vile falsification. It is contrary to reality to place on the same level the aggressive bloc of capitalist states and the defensive organization of the socialist nations. Everyone knows that the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was a response by the socialist nations to the increased danger of war posed by NATO. "Aggressive designs," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a speech delivered in Warsaw on 15 May of this year, "have always been alien to our alliance. It has never acted against the interests of any nation or group of nations. It was created to protect the peaceful labor of our peoples, engaged in building a new life. It was created for our joint struggle to achieve a lasting peace and respect for the sovereign rights of states and for the freedom of peoples. It has always performed its historic mission well, and continues to do so."

Socialism's defense capability is based on the increased economic, political, spiritual and military strength of the fraternal nations. Integration processes are being intensively developed in the world of socialism, and the states and peoples are developing closer and closer interrelations. These are manifested in the combat fraternity existing among the allied armies, which is markedly increasing and expanding possibilities for controlling the forces of aggression. The firm and determined position taken by the Warsaw Pact states has more than once had a sobering affect upon the imperialist war-mongers and forced them to abandon their aggressive plans.

For many years the socialist commonwealth nations provided the courageous Vietnamese people with all round assistance in their struggle against the American interventionists and their Saigon puppets. This assistance, the solidarity of the world's workers and the heroism demonstrated by the Vietnamese patriots were crowned with a victory over the forces of imperialist aggression.

As a result of fundamental changes occurring in the world balance of power, socialism's improved positions and increased influence in the world and the successes achieved in the antiimperialist, liberation struggle waged by the peoples and by national liberation forces, the necessary conditions have been created for making important advances throughout the system of interstate relations and for strengthening international security. Decisions coming out of the anniversary meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact states, held in the capital of the Polish People's Republic, are expected to give powerful new i petus to the process of detente. At the same time, the leaders of the fraternal nations stated firmly that as long as the NATO bloc exists and continues to build up its military strength in an attempt to gain military superiority, the Warsaw Pact states will take all the steps necessary to maintain their defense capability at the proper level. They will always make certain that their peoples are reliably protected.

History has demonstrated the complete groundlessness of every sort of revisionist concepts, which ignore the vital need for a military-political alliance of socialist nations in the face of imperialism's joint military forces. Specifically, the concept of "limited sovereignty" advanced by right-wing opportunists, according to which the joint protection of our revolutionary conquests ostensibly restricts the national sovereignty of the socialist nations, is theoretically unsubstantiated and practically reactionary. In reality, this false concept simply indicates abandonment of the principles underlying socialist solidarity and a refusal to perform one's international duty.

The foreign policy course pursued by the PRC leadership presents an especially great danger to world socialism. Beginning by ignoring the principles of socialist internationalism and by publicizing the concept of "relying upon one's own capabilities," the Maoists arrived at the point of hostile opposition to the socialist commonwealth and then, of joining up with the most disreputable forces of imperialist reaction.

All the efforts of imperialism and its accomplices to break up the socialist commonwealth are doomed to failure, however. Consolidation in all areas of public life remains the definitive trend in the socialist nations' development. This objective process is also reflected in the continued strengthening of the fraternal nations' military unity and the combat fraternity of their armed forces.

Bourgeois ideologists grossly distort the CPSU's historical experience and its contemporary course in the area of military organizational development. They exaggerate in every possible way the old myth that our party's concern for defending real socialism and the revolutionary achievements of the peoples reflects a desire by the Soviet Union to establish Soviet hegemony in the world.

Everyone must know full well that the Soviet Union has never threatened anyone with war and has never attacked anyone. The policies and psychology of the colonizers are alien to the Soviet people. Nonetheless, the West has still not halted, but has even intensified its propaganda campaign based upon an imaginary "Soviet menace." This calls for a reminder of V. I. Lenin's apt comment concerning those who wail about "Red" militarism: "...these are either fools not amenable to any sort of political evaluation of the evidence or political scoundrels" (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 51).

History has demonstrated with no room for doubt the fact that imperialism and its accomplices are solely responsible for the outbreak of invasive wars and create the danger of a world military conflagration. And the more the sphere of imperialist domination is reduced, the more furiously the aggressive and short-sighted members of the bourgeois world react to this. This aggressiveness can only be restrained by the power and the intelligent policy of peace-loving states and by the determination of peoples to frustrate the dangerous plans of the current pretenders to world domination.

This is why our party keeps a close watch over the course of international events and soberly appraises the dynamically changing situation in the world and in the various regions of the world, while it works out far-reaching plans for economic and cultural development and directs the creative work of the Soviet people. In response to the militaristic preparations and the aggressive designs of socialism's foes, the CPSU and the Soviet state are taking the steps necessary to strengthen the nation's defense and to improve our military organization. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at his meeting with the electors of Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District, the Soviet Union's defensive strength is being maintained at the proper level. No one can intimidate the Soviet Union. We have enormous forces and capabilities. We and our allies will always be able to stand up for ourselves and to repel any sudden hostile attack.

Seminar Recommendations

The seminar on the subject "The International Importance of the CPSU's Historical Experience in Building Socialism and Organizing its Armed Defense" deals with an important and urgent subject. It is designed to help officers studying in Marxist-Leninist training groups to thoroughly comprehend the worldwide historical importance of the CPSU's work in the building of socialism and communism, as well as the party's role in providing security for the Soviet people's peaceful labor.

It is recommended that the following topics be discussed in the seminar: 1. The struggle waged by the workers under CPSU supervision to complete the assignments for the 10th Five-Year Plan. 2. The worldwide historical importance of the CPSU's work of building socialism and communism. 3. The importance of CPSU experience in military organizational development and in defending the socialist homeland.

It is helpful to begin by reading a report on "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU On Defending the Conquests of Socialism." The paper should explain Lenin's ideas on the need to defend the socialist homeland and should show how our party is implementing them at the present stage.

Presentation of the second topic should explain primarily how our nation, which has launched the building of socialism, is in the most crucial and decisive sector of the historical confrontation between the two world systems, at the forward edge of the socialist transformation of the world. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Program underscores, regards the building of communism in the USSR as the great international task of the Soviet people, a task serving the interests of the entire world socialist system, the interests of the international proletariat and of all mankind.

The workers of the Soviet Nation understand the full extent of the responsibility assigned them by history and are doing everything possible to make the example of victorious socialism shine more and more brilliantly. The Communist Party devotes priority attention to the nation's economic development, because we exert our main influence upon the international revolution, as V. I. Lenin taught us, with our economic policy (see "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 43, p 341).

The socialist society has convincingly demonstrated its superiority over capitalism by the fact alone that it has rid itself of the plagues and weaknesses inevitably accompanying the bourgeois system, which is based on private ownership and man's exploitation by man, and has rid its society of crises and unemployment. Socialism has proven its superiority in its economic growth rates and in its level of production of many of the most important types of manufactured products. It is a fact that socialism's economy has developed on the upswing for decades. The Soviet Union is first in the world in the production of steel, petroleum, coal and coke, iron ore, pig iron and mineral fertilizers, diesel and electric locomotives, cement, lumber, woolen fabrics, leather footwear, refrigerators and certain other products.

The Soviet Nation is now at the finish of the 10th Five-Year Plan. More than four years of hard work lie behind the Soviet people. A great deal has been achieved during this period both in the economic area and in the field of science and culture, and a further large advance has been made toward creation of the materials and equipment base for communism. The results were recently totaled up for fulfillment of the state plan for the

nation's industry for the first quarter of 1980. The report by the USSR Central Statistical Administration notes that the collectives of industrial associations and enterprises, having launched mass socialist competition for a fitting reception for the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, exceeded their sales of output plan for the first quarter. The industrial production volume increased 5 percent over that for the corresponding period of last year. Labor productivity increased 4 percent, accounting for more than four-fifths of the production growth.

The party never stops promoting the economy's continued successful development. The CPSU Central Committee has outlined extensive measures for this purpose. Measures providing primarily for a buildup of capacities in our fuel and energy system and for improving its structure. A scientific, economically supported state energy program is being developed to bring about a growth of power engineering and to improve the national economy's entire technological base.

Consistent implementation of the party's economic strategy is inseparably linked with the process of increasing production effectiveness and improving work quality. We refer to the stepped up conversion of public production to intensive development, the improvement of national economic end results and the accelerated adoption of achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. The struggle for effectiveness and quality is making new demands of those in charge of the economy. They are reflected in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving the Economic System and the Tasks of Party and State Organs" and the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Improvement of Planning and Intensification of the Effect of the Economic Mechanism to Raise Production Effectiveness and Improve Work Quality."

Economic progress, as emphasized at the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is inconceivable without a modern, highly efficient agriculture. In its development of this sector the party has resolved a large number of agrarian problems. Per capita agricultural output is steadily increasing. Considerable successes have been achieved in grain production. Cotton production is developing strongly. The output of animal husbandry products has grown markedly. We still face difficulties in agriculture, however. The party is therefore devoting special attention to accelerating the growth of agricultural production.

The all round improvement of the economy has created a good basis for improving the people's material and cultural standard of life. Real per capita income increased by more than 13 percent during the four years, retail commodity turnover increased by 18 percent (in comparable prices), and the volume of personal services grew by one-third. A total of 423 million square meters of housing was built, as well as many kindergartens, schools, hospitals and cultural facilities.

In short, a great deal has been accomplished since the 25th CPSU Congress. The Soviet people still have a great deal of work to do in order to achieve all the party's program goals, however. As they enter the 1980's our nation's workers look confidently to the future. Communist ideology and the socialist way of life are imbued with a spirit of historical optimism. Therein lies the main guarantee of our successes in the economic, political and ideological struggle with capitalism.

While discussing the second topic it should be borne in mind that the summarization and study of the CPSU's great experience in building socialism and communism represent one of the most important problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the international communist and workers' movement.

Objectively, the situation has developed in such a way that the Soviet people, headed by the CPSU, are advancing along a virgin land in the social and historical sense, and performing new and extremely difficult tasks in the building and organization of the socialist society and its development into a communist society.

In the process of the CPSU's supervision of the building of socialism and communism, the first such experience has been developed, classic experience of worldwide historical importance. The substance of this experience was concisely described by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his report "Great October and the Progress of Mankind" (see "Leninskim kursom" [On A Leninist Course], Vol 6, p 588).

One of the most important components of the universally significant substance of the CPSU's historical experience is its confirmation of the theoretical conclusion of the Marxist-Leninist classics that the working class cannot achieve its goal without a political party, a new type of party. The CPSU's experience shows what the proletarian party of our era should be like. A revolutionary party of the working class is a party guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and providing the only correct orientation point in the struggle for a victorious socialist revolution and in the building of a new society. The strength of this theory lies in the fact that its vital spirit is formed by revolutionary, materialistic dialectics, which always demand a specific analysis of a specific situation, a close and constant tie-in with real life and a strict scientific approach to reality.

In the process of achieving our revolutionary reforms the CPSU has demonstrated the fact that Marxist-Leninist doctrine is the only true doctrine which meets the requirements for social progress today, provides the answers to basic questions brought up by life and by the practical work of building socialism, and shows peoples how to advance toward their sacred goal.

The CPSU's historical experience teaches revolutionaries to take a creative approach to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and demonstrates the need constantly to develop and enrich it with objective requirements in mind. Along with this, its experience has convincingly confirmed the importance of defending Marxism-Leninism against every sort of opportunistic distortions and revisions. Our party has defended Marxism-Leninism and continues its determined struggle to retain its purity in the situation of acute ideological struggle between the two social systems.

The CPSU's vast experience has demonstrated the fact that a Marxist-Leninist party can only perform the role of a militant avant garde when its ranks remain solid and united. And the communists need unity not only when they are readying the revolution and leading the masses to take the old society by storm, but also in the process of building a new life. This unity is insured by improving the ideological-political level of party members and increasing their authority, organization and efficiency, responsibility, activeness and singleness of purpose, and by developing in them an uncompromising attitude toward manifestations of political apathy, indifference and lack of discipline, that is, toward any behavior which discredits the communist name. Such qualities are formed in party members by a truly communist approach to the resolution of socially important issues and by a feeling of being an active participant in all the party organization's affairs.

The CPSU acquired extremely valuable and diverse experience in the extraordinarily difficult trials of the civil war and foreign intervention, during the nation's industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, during the Soviet people's historic battles with fascism and in the struggle to build developed socialism in the USSR.

All of this has made it possible to derive an extremely important conclusion as to the CPSU's avant garde role and the fundamental importance of its experience, which is reflected in program documents of the world communist and workers' movement and in decisions adopted by fraternal parties. As V. I. Lenin taught us to do, they have singled out primarily that portion of the CPSU's experience which all nations will inevitably have to go through in certain extremely significant aspects of the proletarian revolution (see "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, pp 3, 13).

The substance of the third topic is determined by the classic Leninist principle that "any revolution is worth anything only if it is able to defend itself..." ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 122). This historic lesson, confirmed by our nation's experience, was set forth in the documents of fraternal parties and of the world communist and workers' movement. The Declaration of the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1957, for example, states that defense of the revolutionary conquests is a general law underlying the socialist revolution and the building of socialism. All nations which have set out on the path of socialist

development or are doing so must concern themselves with strengthening their defenses. And the experience of the first socialist nation is of basic importance in this matter.

V. I. Lenin and our party were in the forefront in creating and implementing a complete, well-formulated doctrine on defending the socialist homeland. This doctrine contains extremely important tenets on the objective need to protect socialism from its class enemies; on methods of organizing the defense of the new system; on the nature of the economic, moral-political and scientific and technological preparation of the socialist nations to defend themselves; on ways and means of creating and building up the socialist state's military organization; on the fundamentals and principles underlying the military-political unity of the Soviet republics, and today--socialist nations as well; on the communist parties' leading role in performing all the tasks involved in insuring the socialist nations' security, and others.

Lenin's concepts on defending the socialist homeland were incorporated in shortened form in the CPSU's program, in party congress materials and in the new Constitution of the USSR. These documents describe with maximum precision and proof the dialectical unity between the Soviet Union's peace-loving policy and its preparedness to repel decisively any aggressor.

Our party's experience has been characterized by the correct combination of tasks involved in the building of socialism and those pertaining to its defense, by the balanced resolution of national economic and defense problems. The CPSU has provided history's first answer to these questions and set an example in the balanced development of all elements making up the solid foundation of the nation's insuperable military power.

The international importance of the CPSU's leadership in the defense of socialism lies in the fact that the party devotes an enormous amount of attention to improving the socialist state's military organization in light of the fundamental qualitative changes occurring in weaponry. The party sees to it that the army and navy measure up completely to the demands of modern warfare, that the servicemen become constantly more active in the struggle to insure the homeland's security, that their political awareness increases and that they develop a clear understanding of the just nature of wars fought in defense of the workers' revolutionary conquests.

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POLITICAL WORK: PARTY INFORMATION NEEDS DISCUSSED

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[Article by Maj Gen V. Soshnev, chief of the Organizational Department of the Organizational Party Work Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Party Information"]

[Text] Our party's party information system is set up according to the basic instructions provided by V. I. Lenin, who repeatedly underscored the fact that consistent implementation of the democratic centralism principle is inconceivable without a comprehensive information system, that directing party organs must be thoroughly informed about the work of local organizations, because the strength of the center lies "in its being well-informed about all the cogs and wheels in the party machine" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 7, p 22).

V. I. Lenin considered it extremely important for the communists to have a good knowledge of everything occurring within the party, to be constantly well-informed about all the party's affairs and to thoroughly understand its policy. He regarded the reciprocal briefing and information of "upper" and "lower" elements as an effective means of implementing party decisions and developing a sense of responsibility in the leaders and the rank-and-file communists for their assigned job, for the work of party organizations and of the party in general.

V. I. Lenin also formulated party information requirements. The main ones are regularity, timeliness and objectivity. "We need complete and correct information," he said ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 54, p 446). The information must be based upon knowledge and facts permitting the directing organs not simply to be well-informed about this or that matter or event, but also to detect trends, to derive timely and correct practical conclusions from class possitions. Lenin spoke out resolutely against any sort of embellishment of the information and against empty, meaningless reports. The concreteness of information is mentioned in many of Lenin's letter, telegrams and notes, which begin with the words: "send information from the site of the events," "give us detailed information" and so forth.

V. I. Lenin's instructions on party information are incorporated in the CPSU's charter, which states that directing party organs regularly inform party organizations about their activities. In addition, it is an absolute duty of the party organizations, committees, bureaus and secretaries systematically to provide the higher party organ with information and be responsibile to it for their work.

The Communist Party carried out Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's behests and created a smoothly-structured information system, which functions from the bottom up and from the top down, and constantly concerns itself with improving that system, taking into account the increased scope and complexity of the tasks involved in building communism, the creative activeness of the masses and the CPSU's increased guiding and directing role in the life of Soviet society. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated the following: "We should continue to improve the intraparty information system, to make it more effective and to use it more extensively as an instrument of leadership and a means of indoctrination and control."

The CPSU Central Committee systematically informs local party organs, the active membership and all the other communists on basic issues in the party's work and the nation's domestic and international situation. Regular addresses by leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and by members of the CPSU Central Committee, locally and by radio and television, the distribution of Central Committee documents to the active membership and the discussion of the most most important party decisions at party meetings help the Soviet people to better orient themselves in the situation, to perform their work more purposively and to perceive more clearly their role and place in the overall structure. Decisions coming out of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the plenum, and the decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work," and "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" are of enormous importance in this respect.

The party information system in the Soviet Armed Forces is organized and developed on the basis of general party requirements. Experience has shown us that political organs perform their functions more successfully and direct party-political work more purposively when they are thoroughly familiar with party decisions and aims, with instructions issued by superior commanders and with the state of affairs in the units and on the ships, and react promptly and effectively to incidents and events in army and navy life.

On the fronts the party information system helped command to assess the situation better and to make well-founded decisions, and served as a means of mobilizing the personnel to fulfill the combat tasks. Many reports from the party information system went into summaries issued by the Soviet Information Bureau, gave the Soviet people the truth about the war and

motivated them to combat the enemy. Information provided from the bottom, from the communists and the party organizations, in many cases permitted command to intervene effectively in a situation developing on this or that sector of the front and served as the basis for adopting decisions concerning awards for those who distinguished themselves. The experience acquired by the party information system during the war years is carefully preserved and developed today.

A number of important steps have been taken to improve the party information system in the army and navy. The information is now more current and regular. Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and other general party documents are now distributed more efficiently to the active party membership and to all the other communists. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the political directorates of the services of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets, and the political sections of the formations systematically inform the party organizations on the most important issues of the practical party work, accumulated know-how and shortcomings. It has become part of the system to acquaint party workers with matters under consideration by the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate and at conferences of leading personnel.

Party information coming in from below is actively used by the political organs in the preparation of informational summaries and in the development of recommendations. This was the case, for example, when proposals were worked out on matters pertaining to the organization of competition and the improvement of the work methods of unit party committees and party bureaus. The main source of this information for the superior political organs lies in the close contact between their workers and the active membership, the study and inspection of the state of party work in the forces, the delivery of reports by various categories of political workers, participation in the preparation of party, trade union and Komsomol conferences and meetings, the holding of assemblies and seminars for the active membership and the observations of the party machine. An analysis has shown that the officers with the formation political sections ordinarily receive the bulk of their information by means of these forms of communication. Along with this, the political organs receive a large number of letters from communists and non-members, which not only contain reports on shortcomings but also summarize valuable experience in party life. All of this, along with the scheduled information received from the party organizations, makes it possible to thoroughly analyze and define the most important focuses of party-political work and to increase party influence upon the life and training of the forces.

The demands made of the training of the troops and naval forces are growing each year. Greater responsibility is being placed upon the commanders, political organs and party organizations for the combat readiness, the combat and political training and the discipline of the personnel. As a result, it is highly important for the political organs and party committees to be familiar with the combat training plans, to be in a position to

appraise the state of affairs at the sites objectively and self-critically and to receive objective information from below on a daily basis. They are expected to strive to make their information work militant and aggressive, to see that it actively contributes to the strengthening of contacts with the personnel. And this is the case in many districts, formations and units. Take the political directorate of the Baltic Military District, for example. A group of workers has been designated there to analyze information arriving from below (reports, materials from party organizations, letters, reports on inspections of party-political work and so forth) and to prepare informational documents, which are presented to the military council, the political directorate of the Ground Forces and the Main Political Directorate. The district political directorate compiles surveys of incoming information and is becoming more demanding of political organs and party committees for the quality, objectivity and principled nature of the information. A study has been made of the state of the information system in the political organs and party organizations of the district headquarters and directorates, the Kaliningrad Higher Engineering Order of Lenin, Red Banner School of Engineer Troops imeni A. A. Zhdanov and a number of formation political organs, and the conclusions drawn from this have been reported to the political sections and the active party membership.

The party information system at the political section-primary organization level is also being improved. Questions pertaining to it now occupy an important place in long-range and current plans, which call for both the collection and acquisition of information and for its summarization and the timely and efficient information of the active membership and the other communists on important issues of party work, the combat and political training, socialist competition and discipline. Plans frequently schedule report in the party organizations by officers with the political organs and cover the rendering of needed assistance to the active membership. All of this makes it possible to perform focused organizational and political work in connection with decisions of the party and government and orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, to efficiently summarize progressive know-how and to react spromptly to shortcomings.

It has become the rule in a number of political organs, including the political sections of the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman' Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Division imeni M. I. Kalinin, the Ul'yanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command Twice Red Banner, Order of the Red Star School imeni V. I. Lenin and others, for the party committees and party organization bureaus to inform the political sections on the dates and the agendas of upcoming meetings. This permits senior political workers to decide in advance whether they can participate in these meetings. At the end of every month the political sections receive information containing brief reports on each meeting: when it was held, the agenda, the speakers, who attended from the higher party organs, the number of speakers, the most common proposals and

critical comments, and measures aoutlined in the decisions. All of this information keeps the political sections informed about the state of affairs in the party organizations.

It has become an established procedure in the army and fleet political organs to provide a certain minimum of mandatory, plan information and reports from unit and subunit party organizations, including reports on steps taken to implement party decisions and fulfill combat and political training plans, and reports on the training, the discipline of the communists and reviews of personal situations. This information is supplemented with reports in the political sections from political workers, secretaries of party organizations and other communists and with information on assemblies and seminars, on the work of political organs and party organizations and on proposals and critical comments of communists and Komsomol members.

This kind of information keeps the political organs better informed about all aspects of life in the subunits and units and the work of their party collectives, and helps them to respond more efficiently and promptly to local proposals and criticism.

Unfortunately, these possibilities are not utilized everywhere. We encounter cases in which the workers of some political organs rarely attend party meetings and or party committee sessions and do not consider it necessary, after studying the life of the party organizations, to brief the elective organs as to their opinion. For example, officers from the political section worked repeatedly for more than a year in the party organization of the unit in which Major A. Mikhaylenko served as secretary of the party committee. They did not always thoroughly analyze the party committee's work, however, or take part in its sessions, and they looked in on the meetings extremely rarely. It was therefore not surprising that the deterioration of organizational and political work in the unit was not promptly detected. The shortcomings did not become known until the combat training results were summed up, and they could not be prevented on an operational basis.

Political sections frequently request information on this or that process occurring in the life of a party organization and then limit their role to simply writing down the information and sending it up through the chain of command. Their task, however, is one of thoroughly analyzing the facts and figures, recognizing what lies behind them, assessing them and taking the steps dictated by the circumstances. At one time meetings were held in a number of party organizations to discuss the personal example set by the communists in the observance of regulations. Most of these meetings were highly active ones. Many proposals were submitted and many critical comments were made about the party organizations and about the communists themselves. The correct action was taken in some cases, the results of the meetings were thoroughly analyzed, steps were taken to correct shortcomings in the indoctrinational work and a more demanding attitude was taken

toward the communists. All of this produced good results. Certain political sections did not go beyond summarizing everything said and proposed at the meetings, however, and some of them simply forgot about the meetings. What were the results of this? The efforts which went into setting up and conducting the meetings did not produce the desired results in those cases.

It is not only important to obtain the required information but also to make skillful use of it, to derive conclusions from it for the practical work. Take for example the practice of talking with the communists and hearing their reports, which has become solidly established in the life of the party organizations. Some regard this simply as a means of applying pressure to those who commit errors in their service and conduct themselves in an unfitting manner. Limiting the influence of the above means in this manner is not right, because we know that such errors frequently depend both upon the individual CPSU members and candidate members and the entire party organization and its elective organ. Consequently, each time the talks with the communists and their reports are analyzed, we should think about the conclusions which the party organization and its elective organ should derive for themselves. This is precisely the case in the party bureau headed by Captain-Engineer I. Rykov. In the course of a year more than one-third of all the communists reported at party bureau meetings on the fulfillment of their party and service duty, and individual talks were held with many of them. And when it became apparent as a result of all this that some of the comrades were not active in public life, the party bureau not only drew their attention to this fact but also discussed at a meeting the matter of steps to be taken to raise the public-political activity level of party members and candidate members. As as result of these steps most of the communists are now active propagandists and 66 percent of them are specialists with a higher rating.

We are thoroughly cognizant of the fact that information is only effective when it is objective, when it results from a self-critical appraisal by the communists of their work and of the state of affairs in the unit, on the ship and in the formation. Why then does the information not always meet this requirement? It is partly due to the fact that the information, which honestly reflects a bad situation in this or that section, is sometimes utilized by superior comrades only for criticizing those levels from which the information was received. This is why certain political organs and party committees sometimes concentrate all their attention upon demonstrating their achievements, while ignoring or attempting to downplay the shortcomings. As a result, we have an embellishment of reality, and this has a negative effect upon all the work.

Let us state forthrightly that there is no way to justify the concealment of blunders, omissions or errors or attempts to make the situation appear better than it actually is. This is an incorrect attitude, inconsistent with party principles and he who does so is cutting off the limb on which he sits, so to speak, wh[illegible] ultimately result in failure in his

assigned job. Is this not what happened, incidentally, to Lieutenant Colonel V. Grib, a political worker in the Leningrad Military District. No one can say that he did not report to the political organ. However, his information on the maintenance of military order frequently consisted of justifications and references to difficulties, which made it impossible to form a correct opinion about this important aspect of the work. A check on the situation, however, showed that not everything in the unit was the way V. Grib attempted to portray it. The political organ was forced to hold the comrade strictly accountable for the lack of objectivity in his information. It would not be inappropriate at this point to remind all party workers of the requirement contained in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on 26 April 1979 with respect to the mass media--to increase responsibility for a strict and objective approach to the presentation of the facts and the justification for good ratings and for criticism.

A standpoint of great objectivity is the only correct position, one which indicates that the individual has the proper sense of responsibility. Nothing but accurate information, no matter how pleasant or unpleasant it may be, can permit higher levels to derive the proper conclusions, to provide prompt assistance and to prevent the spread of shortcomings. Ignoring or downplaying the importance of certain negative developments can result in decisions and actions which are not entirely correct and can make the failures and shortcomings worse.

Effectiveness is an important criterion for evaluating information. Many political organs of the Moscow, Kiev and Carpathian military districts and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, for example, arranged to have daily and weekly verbal reports on party-political work aimed at insuring the completion of training tasks and at strengthening discipline, and on the morale of the personnel. As a result, they have a good knowledge of what is occurring at the local level. The initiative taken by a number of political organs in preparing and presenting information on important matters such as ideological work and the public-political activeness of the communists is also worthy of attention.

It needs to be pointed out that information on the work related to the party's most important decisions ordinarily reaches the leading party organs in good time but does not always cover all aspects of the matters involved. Certain political organs and party committees do not go far enough in analyzing the work of publicizing important general party documents and enactments of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate, the fulfillment of recommendations pertaining to the organization of party work in exercises and on cruises, during the performance of combat duty and service tasks, the study of the equipment and weapons or the implementation of measures necessary to further improve the ideological and the political-indoctrinational work.

Naturally, workers with the political section cannot expect to receive this information without any effort on their part. They must organize the information system and arrange to receive reports on exactly those issues which are of interest to the political organ, define in advance the kind of information they want, establish dates for the submission of certain information and indicate the form in which it should be presented--message, memorandum, notation or report. Those political sections are proceeding properly, which involve the active members of the staffs in the information process, instructing them when visiting among the troops to make a careful study of certain aspects of political-indoctrinational work and of life and general conditions in the units and subunits. I had occasion, for example, to hear the reports of a number of communists with the headquarters and the directorates of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, who had been assigned by the political section to acquaint themselves with certain aspects of indoctrinational work while visiting units of the Group during the reports and elections. The staff officers' reports contained substantive information, which answered the questions: How did the meeting go? Were the debates lively? What problems were described as the the most acute by the communists? What action did they recommend, and what shortcomings needed to be corrected?

We also need to discuss the work performed with the information itself in the political organs and party organizations.

Each political organ receives information from any different sources. As mentioned above, these sources are the personal observations of its workers, information provided by the active party members, reports from party organizations, talks with the communists and their reports, letters and complaints, and so forth. The political section also has the opportunity to use the materials of the staffs and legal bodies. This information is only of practical value, however, when it is skillfully used and competently processed.

Experience has taught us that in order to analyze information we must first systematize it, group the reports or facts by specific subject and area, evaluate their significance, importance, authenticity and currentness (the reports and facts may have become outdated and lost their urgency), summarize the data for each unit party organization and for the formation party organizations, compare these data and finally, be able to draw conclusions from the information. Only after all this has been done is it possible to decide how best to use the information obtained: what should be reported to the higher political organ, which matter should be submitted to the formation command and which should be resolved on the spot.

The formation's political organ does not have a special worker in charge of information. Its entire apparatus actually participates in the organization of the information flow. It would therefore be in our interest to teach officers with the political organs and the secretaries of party organizations not only how to examine the situation and obtain information, but

also how to make a scientific, Marxist-Leninist analysis of the developments and processes occurring, to interrelate them and bring out their essence, because "facts," as V. I. Lenin wrote, "if they are taken as a whole, as interrelated, are not only 'stubborn' things but are absolutely conclusive. When minor facts are not taken as a whole, not as interrelated things, they are fragmentary and arbitrary, nothing more than a toy or something even worse... not individual facts must be taken but the entire body of facts pertaining to the issue involved...." (Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, pp 350, 351). We can see from this that it is very important to teach political workers the methods of preparing informational documents, to handle information, materials and reports from a position of objective analysis, which calls for clarification of the essence of a matter and the ability to derive the proper conclusion and submit the most effective proposals and recommendations.

The chief of the political organ is responsible for organizing the information process. He is required personally to make a thorough study of its organization and of how it is analyzed and summarized. At the recommendation of the Main Political Directorate unofficial information workers have been designated in many political organs, who are assigned this area of party work along with their basic official duties. This does not mean, of course, that when such comrades are assigned this job all the other officers are no longer expected to gather and analyze information. Reality itself, however, demands that this be handled by the best qualified person, that he permanently specialize in it, establish the required contacts with party organizations, staff sections and other organs, and acquire skills in the performance of such work. And the job is being properly performed where the training of such comrades has already been set up. At the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980 seminars were conducted for them in many places, informational documents were analyzed and an exchange of know-how was organized. Party information matters were extensively and universally discussed at assemblies of party organization workers and the secretaries of unit party committees and party bureaus held in the districts, groups of forces and fleets.

The November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee demanded that manifestations of negligence and violations of the established plans, regulations and standards be treated especially severely. The fulfillment of this requirement depends greatly upon the organization of the party information system, primarily there where success in the implementation of all our plans and tasks is being determined, that is, in the primary party organizations. Party committees and bureaus have recently increased their attention to this area of the work. It has become a solidly established practice for the elective organs to inform the communists on the fulfillment of decisions coming out of previous meetings and on incoming suggestions and criticism. Those party committees (and party bureaus) are proceeding correctly, which in many cases inform those fighting men who are not members of the party of decisions adopted by the party organization, which makes it possible to familiarize these fighting men with the affairs

of the communists, to develop the political activeness of the personnel and to maintain closer solidarity between CPSU members and non-members in the accomplishment of the common tasks.

Following the example of local party organs, certain large party organizations have begun keeping special cards for purposes of systematizing the information coming in from the lower levels. These cards list matters discussed in the party collectives and contain data on the implementation of decisions, the results of inspections carried out by the party organizations and information on the personal example set by the communists in the service and training, in discipline and in the fulfillment of their socialist commitments. All of this makes it possible to have a better understanding of the state of affairs in the party organizations and to provide the political organs with timely and thorough information. The latter, in turn, are expected to continuously train the secretaries of party organizations in the art of information work and teach them to analyze factual data. The practice of discussing questions pertaining to the organization of the information system at sessions of the party committees and bureaus, at party meetings, at seminars for commanders, political workers and the active members and in the political organs deserves approval.

Information is not just a matter for the leaders of political organs and party organizations. Every communist is expected to delve deeply into the processes occurring in the party and the military life and to inform the party organs about them. It is therefore useful constantly to remind the party members and candidate members of the regulation requiring that they develop criticism and self-criticism, boldly reveal shortcomings and strive to correct them, combat ostentation, conceit, complacency and localistic tendencies, resolutely rebuff all attempts to restrain criticism, speak out against any actions detrimental to the party or state, and report them to party organs, all the way to the CPSU Central Committee.

The information work should be set up so as to insure that the political organ is aware of everything being done in the party collectives, that useful experience is summarized and that shortcomings are promptly detected and corrected, and to make certain that it contributes to the continued strengthening of ties between the party organs and the masses and helps to improve the mquality and the effectiveness of all party-political work. It is important to frequently analyze the state of party information, focusing attention mainly upon its objectivity, effectiveness and currentness.

The party information system is one of the most important means of improving party leadership and verifying performance. It is important to do everything necessary to improve its organization and to make full and competent use of it in the organizational and the ideological-indoctrinational work aimed at achieving the successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned the Armed Forces by the party.

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POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: BENEFITS OF MILITARY SERVICE

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Kostikov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent: "A School of Life, A School of Indoctrination*"]

[Excerpts] Classes on this subject are designed to help the students better understand the fact that service in the Soviet Armed Forces is an irreplaceable school of life for every young person, a school of military work and military training, of moral betterment, courage, patriotism and comradeship.

A total of six hours is allocated for the subject. It is useful to apportion this time in the following manner: two hours for lectures, two hours for indepedent work by students and two hours for seminars.

It is recommended that the following topics be covered in the lectures: 1. The 25th CPSU Congress on the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces; 2. A school of military work and military training; 3. A school of comradeship and military fraternity.

It should be noted in a brief introduction that twice a year new replacements join the military unit or ship. And twice a year tens of thousands of our nation's young citizens, who have completed the school of military service merge into the ranks of the multimillion-strong army of builders of communism. They are greeted with joy and satisfaction in the nation's labor collectives, because these collectives know that yesterday's fighting men have received marvelous ideological, labor and physical conditioning and have graduated from a real school of life. Such people can always be counted upon in all things. They will not let you down.

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* Material for political classes on the subject "The Soviet Armed Forces--A School of Labor and Military Training, Moral Purity and Courage, Patriotism and Comradeship."

The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work" calls military service a school of labor and military training, of moral purity and courage, of patriotism and comradeship. These words acknowledge the great public importance of the military labor performed by Soviet fighting men, of that great role played by the Soviet Armed Forces in the communist indoctrination of the young generation and in the development in them of the good moral qualities of Citizen, Patriot and Fighting Man.

When completing the presentation of the material on this subject, it is important to underscore once again the fact that service in the army is a real school of life. That individual who has army training behind him is not just a good soldier. As a rule, he is also an active builder of communism. The entire nation knows about the famous grain grower, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Gitalov, but not everyone knows that he served as an auto mechanic in the military. Hero of Socialist Labor Nikolay Zlobin, a well-known construction worker in the nation, also served in the military. "The service was a good school for me, as it has been for everyone who has served in the combat ranks," he says. "It was a school of skill and technical knowledge, of persistence and ideological endurance. My serv'ce years conditioned me for life."

There is no greater honor for Soviet fighting men than to justify the trust of the party and the people, to deliver a crushing defeat to any aggressor. They are taught this by their service in the army or navy, a good school of life, a school for the development of patriots and internationalists, active builders of communism, courageous and capable defenders of the homeland.

During the hours designated for independent preparation, it is recommended that the students study V. I. Lenin's works "Onto a Practical Basis" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, pp 408-409) and "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, pp 311-318); the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Articles 31, 32, 59, 62, 63); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "The CPSU Central Committee's Report and Immediate Party Tasks in the Area of Foreign and Domestic Policy" (Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 75-78, 83); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress; Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at a meeting with the electors of Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District (PRAVDA, 23 February 1980).

The following topics should be discussed in the seminar: 1. The 25th CPSU Congress on the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces; 2. Improving military training and the development of courage and heroism--an important task in the training of reliable defenders of the homeland; 3. The growing role of friendship and military comradeship under contemporary conditions; 4. The tasks involved in strengthening comradeship among the troops in our subunit.

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IDEOLOGY: CAPITALIST STRESS ON TECHNOLOGY CRITICIZED

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[Article by Col B. Bogdanov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent: "Technicistic* Myths Serving Militarism and Reaction"]

[Text] The ideological struggle today is one of the most important fronts in the class confrontation between the two world systems--capitalism and socialism. The 25th CPSU Congress pointed out that in the current situation issues pertaining to the ideological struggle are increasingly moving to the fore. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committe "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work" stressed the fact that imperialist propaganda, with which the propaganda of the Beijing hegemonists and chauvinists is now openly interacting, is engaged in a continuous "fierce attack upon the minds of the Soviet people, employing the most sophisticated methods and modern technical means in an attempt to poison their minds with slander against Soviet reality, to tarnish socialism's image and give a false color to imperialism and its plunderous, inhuman policy and practices."

Many theoretical questions pertaining to the analysis of the essence, the content and specific features of the scientific-technological revolution--one of the bridgeheads in the competition and the historic confrontation between socialism and capitalism--have also come under focus in the extremely acute struggle of ideas. In the capitalist nations, the scientific and technological revolution is exacerbating the conflicts between the public nature of production and the capitalist system of appropriating the production results, increasing all the social antagonisms, especially those between labor and capital, producing enormous waste of the society's resources by the militarist machine and giving rise to a number of social problems which affect the fate of millions of people throughout the world.

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* [Tekhnitsizm, preoccupation with technical aspects of something.]

Imperialism bears historic responsibility for the fact that the achievements of scientific and technological progress are being used to an enormous extent for military purposes, in preparations for a new world war. The basic change in means of conducting warfare brought about primarily by the development of nuclear missiles and their adoption by the armed forces, has raised the most important problem of international relations, that of war and peace, to a new level. Imperialism's policy, which is directed toward the use of many achievements of scientific and technological progress for militaristic purposes, has created an extremely great danger for mankind--the menace of a world thermonuclear conflict.

The increased attention given by bourgeois ideologists to the scientific and technological revolution and to its social consequences has to do with their desire to rearm themselves ideologically, to overcome a prolonged spiritual crisis. The monopolistic bourgeoisie proved incapable of resolving the conflicts created by the capitalist system. They are attempting to find ways to soften these conflicts, however, to seek out theoretical and practical solutions to social problems related to science and technology, which would enable them to strengthen the base upon which their domination hinges. Bourgeois and opportunistic ideologists gladly make extensive use of fashionable "technicistic" ideas and theories as they advance various concepts, one after the other, which parasitize the scientific and technological revolution and the changes it is bringing in the social life. We have not encountered "straightforward" "technicism" so very frequently of late, to be sure. Certain authors of bourgeois sociological theories refer to many different factors and attempt to utilize various methods and approaches (systemic, structural, functional and others). Many also interpret the essence of the scientific and technological revolution and its social effects in an "anti-technicistic" sense. The bourgeois philosophy of technology, intrinsically contradictory and eclectic, is reflected in the most diverse sociopolitical doctrines. There is a reason for the recent increase in the amount of attention given to "technicism" concepts by the dominant classes of the capitalist nations. The imperialists see in technology, especially military technology, a force which can give them supremacy and privileges both within the nation and internationally. The ideology of "technicism," they assume, makes it possible to justify their claims to even greater power within the state and an even greater role in the society.

There is an acute ideological struggle under way over issues of war and peace, in the military-theoretical area. A number of works written by bourgeois theoreticians and military ideologists on these issues reflect the strong influence of "technicism," which has now become a significant aspect of the philosophical foundation of bourgeois military ideology and military science. Many bourgeois ideologists with "technicistic" inclinations attempt to justify theoretically militarism, the aggressive foreign policy of the imperialist states, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Certain militaristic circles frequently use "technicistic" concepts as the "theoretical justification" for their demands for increased military allocations,

the enlargement of this or that service of the armed forces or troop arm and the adoption of a certain type of weapon or military equipment. The concepts of "technicism" appealed to military reactionaries, who find in concepts attaching absolute importance to the role of military equipment and weapons the philosophical and sociological basis for imperialism's military doctrines and for aggressive military-political and strategic military plans.

Ideological diversionary activities and subversive propaganda, which frequently employ "technicistic" myths and concepts, have now been elevated to the level of state policy in the United States and other imperialist nations.

Just what is "technicism"? "Technicism" is a posture toward the world, which attaches absolute importance to the role of technology in the life of society, as well as a specific methodological approach to the study of social phenomena, characteristic of a number of bourgeois sociological theories. The hypothesis that the technical factor in the society's life, interpreted from an idealistic standpoint, is the basic and leading concept of "technicism" as the aggregate of views on the nature of technology and its role in the life of society. Technology is proclaimed to be the main system-forming element of social progress and the main moving force (the only one, according to some authors) behind the historical process, separated from the society by an uncontrollable force and imposing its will upon the people, while man and mankind are regarded as a passive object acted upon by a fatal external force from uncontrollable, natural-scientific and technical forces. The "technicistic" approach to the "man and technology" problem demonstrates a lack of understanding of the nature of both man and technology and of their dialectical unity, downgrades the role of man and ignores the sociopolitical and class aspects of the relationship between man and technology.

The class essence of "technicism" results from the fact that it serves the interests of the dominant classes—sometimes in a fairly subtle and flexible manner, but with absolute certainty—protects the foundations of the bourgeois social structure and diverts the attention of the workers away from social and political problems and from the class struggle for a revolutionary restructuring of society.

In recent decades numerous bourgeois sociological theories have emerged, having to do with the revolution in science, technology and military affairs and based upon "technicistic" methodology. They include, among others, technocratic theories, the theories of a "single industrial society," "convergence" and a "postindustrial society," and so forth.

Prominent among the bourgeois concepts for interpreting the role of scientific and technological progress in the modern role are the "technocratic" theories (the term "technocracy" comes from the Greek words "techne" meaning craft or skill, and "kratos," meaning supremacy or authority). By the

authority of the technocracy contemporary bourgeois ideologists ordinarily mean the authority of people possessing extraordinary technical knowledge, of the higher scientific and technological intelligentsia, managers, specialists and experts.

One of the first to come up with technocratic concepts was American professor James Burnham, author of the book "The Managerial Revolution" (1940). He maintained that a single technocratic state would be created in the future, that leadership and authority in it would go to the managers--directors and supervisors engaged in the administrative control of production--and that capitalism would be replaced not by socialism but by a "system of managers." Burnham asserted that the process of transition to this "new system" would then occur in the form of a spontaneous "revolution of the managers." Following the war, Burnham's ideas were taken up by many bourgeois philosophers and sociologists and went into the foundation of a number of technocratic theories speculating on individual aspects, developments and processes of the scientific and technological revolution, which was acquiring ever-increasing scope.

The social purpose of technocratic theories is that of disguising the class antagonisms of the bourgeois society, the irreconcilability and antithetical nature of the goals and interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the working class. If the capitalists were to lose their former dominant position and power in the economy and the state would go over to the technocrats, as J. Burnham predicted and as echoed by his followers today, there would be no need for a class struggle against the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. And the responsibility for increasing exploitation of the working masses and for all the evils and defects in the bourgeois society would now be placed upon the technocrats. The authors of the technocratic theories endeavor to refute Marxist analysis of the class structure of society and and the trends in its modification, first and foremost, the conclusion as to the worldwide historic mission of the working class.

The theory of a "single industrial society" (J. Galbraith, R. Aron, W. Rostow) was widespread in bourgeois sociology and propaganda in the 1960's. The authors of this theory attach absolute importance to certain similar developments occurring in the industrially developed capitalist nations and the socialist nations, developments related to the scientific and technological revolution: the development of new branches of industry (electrical engineering, chemical, atomic power engineering), changes in the social and occupational structure of the population, production automation, urbanization (a growth of the function of cities and of the urban population), expansion of the services sector, and a number of others.

This theory takes into account only technical and economic indices and technological characteristics, while leaving out the basic social distinctions between capitalism and socialism and ignoring the fact that the nature of societal relations is determined not by technological processes but by the form of ownership of the means of production. The authors of

the theory of the "single industrial society" deal with such criteria as the level of technological development and the degree of perfection of technological relations in isolation from the sphere of production relations, and ignore the dominant type of production relations. The social-class purpose of this theory is that of defending capitalism and discrediting real socialism. It praises in a slightly disguised form the capitalist way of life and the capitalist path of development.

The "convergence" theory (P. Sorokin, J. Fourastie, O. Flechtheim) is closely related to the theory of the "single industrial society." The authors of this theory assert that as the scientific and technological revolution develops, the qualitative differences between capitalism and socialism will gradually disappear and a certain hybrid society will emerge, based on private ownership of the means of production (the word "convergence," Latin in origin, means coming together or approaching).

However, there has not been and there could not be any sort of "synthesis" of socialism and capitalism, any "dissolution" of socialism in capitalism. Any attempt to get around the main conflict of our era, the conflict between capitalism and socialism, is futile and reactionary. Proponents of the "convergence" theory would like to mitigate the fundamental difference between capitalism and socialism by spreading the myth about an impending synthesis of the opposite socioeconomic systems, and to prove the vitality of the bourgeois system, conceal its class nature, draw the attention of workers in the capitalist nations away from the struggle for a fundamental social restructuring of society, blunt the efforts of workers in the socialist nations to build a new society, and bring about socialism's gradual conversion into capitalism.

The continued exacerbation of capitalism's conflicts in the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's and the failure of attempts to disarm socialism ideologically made the illusory nature of the theories of the "industrial society," "convergence" and the like apparent to many in the West. It was in this situation that a new group of theories came into being and began to become fashionable. In these theories the "technicistic" concepts are presented in a slightly more veiled form--the so-called "futurology" theories (from the Latin "futurum," meaning future, and the Greek "logos," meaning word or teaching). For example, the theory of the "postindustrial society" advanced by American futurologist D. Bell gained great popularity among bourgeois ideologists and propagandists. This theory reflected to a certain degree some of the new trends in bourgeois reformism (in Latin "post" means after). In the postindustrial society, D. Bell predicted, the working class and the bourgeoisie, class antagonists in the capitalist society, would gradually disappear and actual power would automatically go to the "new class of specialists and technicians."

This theory attached great importance to equipment (tekhnika) and technology. D. Bell, however, shifts the emphasis from production equipment to "intellectual" equipment--administrative, scientific research and

experimental equipment and electronic computers. He gives special attention to the growing role of science in the life of contemporary society, a significant feature of the scientific and technological revolution. However, the American futurologist credits science with a feature it does not have—that of fundamentally altering social and production relations. The growth of science's social role is certainly not a determining factor in societal life and it certainly does not reflect the nature of the capitalist society's replacement by a socialist one.

The reactionary, crudely utopian nature of the "postindustrialism" ideology is apparent from the fact that it substitutes technical reorganization conforming to the interests of the bourgeoisie for the fundamental economic and political transformation of society. A reaction by bourgeois ideology to the intensification of capitalism's social crisis, the theory of the "postindustrial society" proclaims the need for a "strategy of survival" and is working out for the dominant class a program for influencing the conduct and consciousness of the masses, in order to neutralize social effects of the scientific and technological revolution dangerous for the capitalist system. The formulas worked out by D. Bell do not go beyond the framework of bourgeois reformism. Whether they want to or not, the theoreticians of "postindustrialism" have in fact been forced to acknowledge capitalism's inability to resolve its inherent, deeply rooted conflicts and contradictions.

"Technicistic" theories are openly directed against the Marxist-Leninist doctrine describing socioeconomic formations as qualitatively defined stages of the historic process. The new, postcapitalist society can be none other than a communist society (with socialism as the first phase). Bourgeois ideologists endeavor to refute the scientifically-based Marxist-Leninist argument that communism represent a bright future for mankind, and for this purpose they put forth various speculative, pseudoscientific concepts such as the "single industrial society," the "industrial society" and so forth. The scientific forecast of society's future made by the Marxist-Leninist classics, however, was based on a thorough understanding of the objective nature of social progress. Communism, they proved, differs fundamentally from the exploitative types of society based on private ownership of the means of production.

The movement to the forefront of the criterion of technical progress is due, among other things, to the ideological function which "technicistic" concepts fulfill. Their authors try to speculate on the fact that for a number of temporary historic reasons the socialist nations are behind the United States in certain technical equipment and production level indices. They use this fact in their attempts to depict the United States of America as precisely that nation which has ostensibly come the closest to the ideal social structure and the capitalist path of development followed by the United States as the path which should be taken by all the world's nations. Ideas of this kind, however, are nothing other than illusions and myths, highly reactionary and extremely harmful ones at that, because the contemporary era is the era of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism.

The issue of man and equipment in a war is one of the basic, fundamental problems of viewpoint and methodology in military theory and practice. The way this problem is interpreted determines the substance of a state's military-technical policy and how the optimal correlation of services of the armed forces and troop arms and of types of weapons within each is determined for a given stage in the development of military affairs. Only the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army and the socialist state's military science provide a truly scientific solution to this problem.

The "technicistic" approach to the problem of "man and equipment in a war" has a tendency to contrast the equipment to man. The works of many bourgeois ideologists and military theoreticians attach absolute importance to the role of military equipment and weapons, while downgrading or limiting the role of man and his spiritual strength in modern warfare. "Technicistic" views on the correlation of man and equipment in a war reflect the viewpoint of only a portion of the bourgeois scholars, of course. The significance of the morale and fighting efficiency of personnel in the armed forces is acknowledged in one way or another in the military doctrines of the bourgeois states. Views and concepts which attach absolute importance to the role of military equipment are still extremely widespread in the capitalist nations and bourgeois armies, however. "Technicism" has played a considerable role in the development of bourgeois military and military-philosophical thinking, and continues to do.

In the situation of the revolution under way in military technology "technicistic" trends are especially clearly defined in the approach taken by a number of bourgeois scholars to the understanding of developments in warfare and military affairs. The influence of "technicism" is particularly apparent in the way certain bourgeois philosophers and ideologists view such matters as the origin, the causes and the nature of wars; the influence of military technology upon the life of society; the role of military equipment and of separate types of equipment in a war; the correlation of man and equipment in the military organization and in a war; the commander's role and the substance of his work in a situation in which various types of automatic computer equipment are being increasingly used in all areas of control in the military.

Klaus Knorr, professor at Princeton University and consultant to the State Department and the Pentagon, wrote the following in his book "The War Potential of Nations": "as a result of the rapid development of equipment and the ongoing mechanization of the armed forces the quantity of arms at a specific military strength has begun playing a more important role than such qualitative factors as military leadership and the physical stamina and valor or even simply the numerical strength of the armed forces. War has become a matter more of machines than of people, as never before."

The spread of "technicistic" views to developments in warfare and military affairs, particularly to methods of manning and equipping the army, reflects a distrust of mass armies by the dominant classes, fear of the growth of

political awareness in the people, of the penetration of progressive ideology into the bourgeois armies and of an armed people, and an attempt to downgrade the role of the popular masses in historic events, particularly in wars. Many bourgeois ideologists assert that the future lies in small armies outfitted with first-class equipment and manned by professional mercenaries separated from the people and ready unhesitatingly to carry out the will of the dominant classes and to use weapons for the sake of their egotistical interests, both against the workers of their own nation and against other peoples.

Approaching problems of military art and troop control in the situation of the revolution in military technology from the standpoint of "technicism" frequently results in the attachment of absolute importance to the role of military control equipment, in a reduction of the role of the military leader and of the commander in an armed struggle, and in statements about an imaginary danger of deterioration of military art and of the creative principle in military affairs in general in the era of electronics and cybernetics. Some bourgeois military ideologists believe that progress in military technology can result in the complete elimination of the commander from the process of controlling the armed struggle and even from the armed struggle itself. O. Miksche, for example, has written the following: "As a result of the triumph of the material over the spiritual, military art has deteriorated to the level of military technique, and the military leader has become a sort of mechanic for the military machine. The military leader's creativity and his art are being replaced by technical routine."

Military equipment has always been that material factor without which it is impossible to conduct an armed struggle. V. I. Lenin stated that in a war "he who has the greatest technology, the best organization and discipline and the best machines gains the upper hand" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 116). In the situation of the revolution in military technology, when a basic, qualitative advance is being made in the development of technical means of warfare, the role of military equipment, especially the latest types of weapons, is increasing sharply. And this trend is an objective natural law. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, has stressed the fact that the new weapons are having a great affect upon the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, that they are bringing major changes to all areas of military affairs, to the organization of the troops and the forms and methods employed in combat operations, and are placing greater demands upon the training of the personnel, upon their morale and political qualities, psychological stability and physical stamina.

The increased role of military equipment, however, and the development of qualitatively new weapons are not reducing man's role at all, but are expanding his capabilities in an armed struggle. Not a single new type of weapon can function without or apart from man. "Man has been and remains the decisive force in a war," states Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. The development of new types of weapons and the use of

electronics and cybernetics in military affairs are not producing a change in the correlation between man and equipment in favor of the latter but a replacement of one "man-military equipment" system by a qualitatively different system.

The development of the armed forces is now taking place in a situation of rapid scientific and technological progress. As Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, renowned Soviet military leader, has stressed, however, this should not serve as an excuse for downgrading the role of generals in the direction of military operations. "The scientific and technological revolution has brought many new things to military affairs, to the forms and methods used for directing the troops," he wrote in his book "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Lifetime Job]. "In my opinion, however, it is not correct to say that the engineer and the computer have replaced the general on the battlefield. The term "general" is not simply a nice name for a military leader or a tribute to the past. It reflects the characteristics of the conduct of an armed struggle and shows that gifted and strong-willed military leaders have a great deal to do with how it progresses and with its outcome."

"Technicistic" concepts which declare science and technology, especially military technology, to be the source and cause of wars in the era of the scientific and technological revolution and which attach absolute importance to their role in the development of international conflicts and sites of military tensions have received a certain acceptance in bourgeois philosophy and sociology. These concepts interpret war as a fatal consequence of the spontaneous and automatic development and functioning of technology, and technology as some mystical, demoniacal force dominating over man and mankind, uncontrollable and unmanageable, as a self-determining cause of wars. Militaristic ideologists Strausz-Hupe (Kiffer), (Flyueiling), Mayo and others.

Theories of this kind are designed to disguise the true sources and causes of wars explained in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, and to clear the forces of imperialism, aggression and reaction of responsibility for preparing, launching and conducting unjust wars. It is not the revolution in military technology which has produced the arms race, reactionary wars and militarism, but the capitalist production system, the political relations which have developed on the basis of that system and the reactionary political goals for the sake of which armed force is employed.

The ideologists of "technicism" do not wish to acknowledge the fact that war is a sociopolitical phenomenon and that military equipment, as an instrument of policy, is in the final analysis always subordinate to it. Policy and military equipment are correlated as goal and means, after all. The basic and most important function of military equipment derives from the fact that it is designed to serve policy and to achieve political

goals. According to V. I. Lenin's definition "war is simply a continuation of policy by other" (specifically forceful) "means" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 224).

The assigning of an absolute role to equipment, first and foremost, to military equipment in societal life and especially in the area of military strategy and foreign policy constitutes that basic "theoretical" premise which is used by the military-industrial complex and militarists in the West to justify the cult of military force and acceleration of the arms race.

The core and characteristic feature of all the strategic military concepts which have replaced one another in the United States--"massive retaliation" (the 1950's), "flexible response" (the 1960's) and "realistic deterrent" (the 1970's) has been a cult of military might based upon weapons of mass destruction and the other latest weapons. The "new defense concept of Western Europe" is also imbued with the cult of nuclear weapons. This is an American strategic military doctrine designed to justify "theoretically" attempts to achieve military superiority for NATO over the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. It calls for the creation of a totally new component of the Joint Armed Forces (OVS) of NATO in Europe—a "European strategic nuclear force." In accordance with this concept Western Europe would become the launching ground for American strategic weapons.

A session of the NATO Council held in Brussels in December of 1979 adopted a decision to produce and deploy new medium-range American nuclear missiles in a number of Western European states, a decision endangering the cause of peace and detente. These are a qualitatively new weapon, capable of reaching into the Soviet Union, which creates a new strategic situation in Europe. In doing so, the heads of NATO initiated a new and dangerous stage in the nuclear rearmament of this aggressive bloc.

Simultaneously with the NATO session's adoption of the decision on the production of new systems of American nuclear missiles and their deployment in Europe, U.S. President J. Carter announced that the U.S. military strength would be built up, spoke out in favor of the dangerous and slippery path of an unrestrained arms race, rivalry and confrontation, and repeated once again the dogma, long since discredited, of conducting policy "from a position of force," a "diplomacy of dictation." He presented a five-year program for the United States, which calls for a buildup of strategic nuclear missiles and conventional weapons, and announced an increase in U.S. military allocations for the 1981 fiscal year and subsequent years. The NATO Brussels decisions and Carter's militaristic program present a direct challenge to the vital interests of peoples, to their desire for peace and for relief from the heavy burden of growing military outlays.

The ideal of many bourgeois military ideologists and military leaders is the "technical" soldier, who skillfully services the complex equipment but is indifferent to problems of outlook and morality and to the political

goals of the war, and carries out orders unthinkingly, like a robot--a blind and obedient tool in the hands of the dominant classes. The "technicistic" type of thinking overemphasizes the significance of special technical training, while at the same time downplaying or ignoring other qualities essential in the fighting man.

The psychology of the so-called "pure technician (tekhnar')," an individual more or less knowledgeable in his specialty but apolitical and uncultured, spiritually and emotionally impoverished, is alien to the Soviet fighting man. It is obvious that the role and importance of special technical training for the personnel and of technical military sophistication is increasing in the situation of a revolution in military technology. In order for the fighting man successfully to perform the combat tasks, however, he must possess a large number of other characteristics and qualities--moral-political, intellectual, psychological and physical--and needs good ideological conditioning and all-round, systematic and purposive political, tactical, fire and physical training.

The Leninist principle of party-mindedness in science requires that we conduct an aggressive and uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology, against all its manifestations and forms. "Technicism" has demonstrated for all to see its theoretical weakness and its inability to provide any consistent scientific analysis of or solutions to the social problems surrounding science and technology, and problems of military theory. Life, historic experience, the practical conduct of the class struggle and the continued development of military affairs have demonstrated the groundlessness of the basic ideas, concepts and myths of "technicism" and have dispelled many of the illusions, attitudes, expectations and beliefs associated with it. They are being replaced with new or altered forms and portrayals of "technicism." Its nature and its ideological functions have not changed, however. The critical analysis of the theoretical positions of "technicism," particularly "technicistic" trends, found in the approach taken by many bourgeois scholars to the understanding of developments in warfare and in military affairs and the clarification of their ideological bent therefore remain a current and important task.

The struggle against bourgeois ideology, including that waged against "technicistic" views, has an important place in the indoctrination of Soviet fighting men in a spirit of communist ideals. We must continue to develop in the homeland's armed defenders a strong immunity to that spiritual poison given off by capitalism. The determining function in the development of the spiritual caliber of our fighting men is performed by the Marxist-Leninist world outlook--the ideological foundation of their political awareness, their selfless devotion to the cause of socialism, their great sense of personal responsibility to the party and the people for the irreproachable performance of their military duty, their ardent love for the socialist homeland and a constant state of readiness to defend it selflessly.

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NAVAL FORCES: TRAINING OF SHIP COMMANDERS

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[Article by Vice-Adm V. Samoylov, first deputy commander of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "The Ship Commander"]

[Text] The following took place during the grim years of the Great Patriotic War. In April of 1944 a detachment of torpedo boats commanded by Captain Lieutenant S. Kotov detected an enemy convoy with 18 pennants, stealthily took up an advantageous position and successfully attacked the convoy. Three fascist transports were sent to the bottom.

After using up all their ammunition, two of the boats set a course toward the base. Senior Lieutenant G. Rogachevskiy, commander of the third boat, which had sunk a transport with the first attack, decided to launch a second torpedo against a new target. He had barely begun maneuvering onto the firing course when a group of enemy patrol boats attacked our ship with an avalanche of fire. The torpedo boat received some holes in its side and some members of the crew were wounded. Taking advantage of his ship's faster speed, Rogachevskiy began drawing away from the enemy. He could have returned to base, and he would probably not have been criticized had he done so. However, the valorous commander felt that the remaining torpedo could and should destroy yet another enemy vessel. Motivated by a sense of duty, he detected another detachment of fascist ships and turned his boat toward the enemy. The Hitlerites opened up with dense fire against him and against the boats pursuing him, which the Hitlerites took to be Soviet boats. Taking advantage of the battle which broke out between the fascists, Rogachevskiy's crew executed a rapid maneuver, returned to the convoy and torpedoed a self-propelled barge. While returning to the base, they were forced to engage in yet another unequal battle with three enemy torpedo boats. The Soviet sailors emerged victorious from this duel as well, thanks to the commander's highly developed sense of duty and tactical skill, to the boldness and daring of his decisions and to the good combat training of the personnel.

The combat chronicle of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet contains numerous such examples of a highly developed sense of responsibility, good professional training and aggressiveness in battle on the part of commanders. The slogan "Find, attack and destroy the enemy!" was an inexorable rule for submarine commanders. Heroes of the Soviet Union B. Alekseyev, M. Greshilov, A. Kasayev, Ya. Iosseliani, and M. Khomyakov, even though it was frequently necessary for them to risk their lives. Captain 3d Rank V. Yeroshenko, commander of the lead destroyer "Tashkent," Captain 2d Rank A. Gushchin, commander of the Guards cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" and many other heroes of the war successfully carried out their assigned combat missions under the most difficult of conditions and found a way out of what appeared to be hopeless situations. The fierce battles with the enemy especially brought out their political maturity, their selfless devotion to the socialist homeland, the Communist Party and the Soviet people, their loyalty to their military duty, their boldness and bravery, their tactical skill and their ability to perform the combat mission no matter what.

In the year of the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over fascist Germany we return again and again to the valuable experience of the Great Patriotic War, learn from it and use it as a frame of reference for measuring our present affairs and concerns. Today's ship commanders adopt all the best from their predecessors, the heroes of past battles. Religiously preserving and adding to the glorious traditions and creatively applying the know-how of the frontline soldiers, they demonstrate their ability in the combat training to fulfill their greaty duty and crucial responsibilities with honor and dignity.

"The words assignment (dolzhnost') and duty (dolg) are derivatives of the same root," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at his meeting with workers of Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District. "One must always remember one's duty to the people--party and service, and as a human being. A real party and soviet worker does not and cannot exist without the undeviating fulfillment of this duty, without the ability to link word and deed together with a strong drivebelt. His good reputation is based upon great industry and discipline, demandingness of himself and incorruptible integrity. And this reputation must be upheld throughout and with one's entire life." These basic principles also fully apply to military cadres. Our commanders have accepted them as party demands, as a guide to action.

As a result of the concern demonstrated by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the fleet has been transformed to an unrecognizable degree, and the navigation and combat capabilities of the ships have grown immeasurably. They can cruise for a long time and perform operational-tactical missions in all regions of the World Ocean. The ship commander's role has become even greater as a result. He is rightly considered to be the central figure in the fleet. His special position is determined by one of the basic Leninist principles of military organizational development--sole command. The ship commander enjoys enormous trust and is invested with extensive rights and authority. He bears personal responsibility to the

Communist Party and the Soviet government for maintaining the ship entrusted to him in a constant state of combat and mobilization readiness, for the combat and political training, the indoctrination, the military discipline and political-moral state of the personnel and for the crew's preparedness and ability to perform the missions required to protect the state interests of the homeland.

In isolated cruises on the ocean expanses and during calls at foreign ports, situations sometimes arise in which the commander is forced to act at his own discretion, weighing the situation and observing the interests and the dignity of the Soviet state. And lastly, the complexity and the dynamic nature of modern combat and the existence of powerful modern weapons make exceptionally great demands of the political maturity, the ideological-theoretical outlook and the naval, combat and tactical training of the ship commander. As the organizer of combat, he must possess strong determination, creative initiative and the ability to think unconventionally, to retain his self-control and endurance in critical situations, to skillfully run the ship and direct the crew, to make efficient use of the weapons and equipment, to insure unconditional completion of the combat mission in the most difficult situation and to achieve victory.

There are many young ship commanders in the fleet. And although only those officers with the best all-round training are assigned to this post, at first they need help from their senior comrades. While we previously accepted the fact that a commander gained maturity with the passage of time, the enlarged tasks and the very nature of the service today require that we accelerate the commander's development.

With all this in mind, the fleet military council, political directorate and staff and the commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations of the units and formations give constant attention to the selection, training and indoctrination of ship commanders and to providing them with unshakable ideological conviction, a broad theoretical and military-technical perspective and an acute feeling of responsibility for their assigned job. We strive to see that every commander thoroughly understands the enormous responsibility placed upon him by his assignment, that he performs his duty selflessly and energetically and that he maintains the ship in a constant state of combat readiness insuring its immediate entry into battle to protect the socialist homeland whenever necessary.

A well-rounded system has been developed in the fleet for working with ship commanders. Conferences and assemblies, scientific-theoretical and scientific-practical conferences and seminars for the exchange of know-how are periodically conducted for the officers. At these meetings the commanders thoroughly study the demands set by the 25th party congress and by plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's instructions and recommendations on defense matters, on improving the work style and methods and on strengthening discipline and organization, and learn the political approach to the performance of tasks and the comprehensive

handling of the entire job of indoctrination. As a rule, general party requirements are closely related to the specific tasks facing the ships and units. Emphasis is placed upon the dissemination of advanced know-how. This was done, for example, at a scientific-practical conference dealing with the improvement of the commanders' workstyle and methods, based on the principles and recommendations outlined in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth] and "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands]. The discussion of tasks involved in improving political vigilance and combat readiness and stepping up the campaign against bourgeois ideology, Zionism and Maoism in light of the requirements set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work" and decisions coming out of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee at a seminar for ship commanders and political workers was also conducted in this manner. At a scientific-theoretical conference on "V. I. Lenin's and the CPSU on Defending the Socialist Homeland and on the Moral-Political Qualities and the Combat Efficiency of Soviet Fighting Man" the commanders assessed their work from the standpoint of Lenin's instructions and party demands.

The military council regards party indoctrination of the commanders as a priority task, and questions pertaining to their selection and training are systematically discussed at its meetings. It works together with the staff and the political directorate to see that every ship commander organically combines party-mindedness with thorough competence, responsibility and discipline with a creative approach to the job and a sense of the new, strict demandingness and intolerance of shortcomings with sensitivity toward the men and the ability to rely upon the party organization for assistance. In short, we try to see that every ship commander constantly improves his workstyle and methods in accordance with the party's instructions and the requirements set by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The ship commander organizes the training and indoctrination of the men under his command. The quality and effectiveness of the combat and political training, the level of regulation order and discipline among the crew members, the ship's combat readiness, the successful performance of its missions and ultimately, victory in a battle, depend primarily upon the commander's professional and methodological skill, his accurate leadership and demandingness. At conferences, assemblies and seminars and in our work with the fleet's supervisory personnel on the ships themselves we therefore set ourselves the goal not simply to equip the commanders with a certain amount of additional knowledge, but to develop in them an understanding of the vital necessity and need to improve their political, operational-tactical and military-technical level and to perfect their skills in directing the divisions and services. We strive to see that the commander has a thorough understanding of the nature and the characteristics of modern naval combat and of the personnel and means and the tactics of a

likely enemy, that he thoroughly understands the demands made of the training and indoctrination of the fighting men, that he clearly perceives the correct way to achieve good end results in the training and that he constantly seeks new techniques and methods for organizing classes, drills and exercises and for working out the practical combat tasks.

Methods, instructions and standard recommendations on questions pertaining to the effectiveness of training and indoctrination are being developed to assist the fleet's staff and directorate officers and unit and formation staff specialists. Under the supervision of Captains 1st Rank G. Yefremov, A. Dyadyun and V. Poshivaylov, for example, a set of methods was worked out for organizing competition among the crews for best seagoing ASW team, which has given the competition among ASW personnel concreteness and efficiency and has helped to increase the efficiency and improve the quality of the training. The fleet's combat training section has improved the procedure for planning the tasks for the year and for the individual training periods. The strictly regulated schedules have been eliminated for each of them, and the emphasis is now upon surprise in the performance of firing and other combat exercises. For one thing, this innovation has given the ship commanders greater freedom to exercise initiative. In the second place, it has motivated them to prepare their subordinates for naval combat more systematically and thoroughly and to take a comprehensive approach to the special, tactical and fire training, damage control, protection against weapons of mass destruction and the practical mastery of all forms of ship defenses.

The dual exercise system extensively used in the fleet, whereby the two participants perform their own missions in an attempt to gain victory in the training battle, and do not simply support one another as in the past, is helping to improve the tactical skill of ship commanders and to make them more aggressive in combat. That commander and that crew which are the first to attack and which make effective use of their weapons receive the best rating. This method motivates the commanders to demonstrate creative initiative, tactical cunning and daring, and the crew to perform at full capacity.

The training and indoctrination of ship commanders is performed mainly by their immediate superiors in the units and formations. Commander's days have now become a tradition. They are producing results in the ASW unit in which officer A. Tsikalo serves as political worker, for example. On that day the ship commanders hear lectures and reports on current CPSU policy issues and on ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination subjects, pedagogy and psychology. The exchange of know-how, group exercises and short tactical exercises involving individual elements of modern warfare, demonstration exercises on board the outstanding ships in organizing the operations of the main control room, the combat information center and the ship's ASW team, and in procedures for using the weapons and equipment, and so forth are also extensively employed. Following the

exercises conducted on commander's days on the outstanding large ASW ships "Ochakov" and "Kerch'," the officers stated with satisfaction that they had learned a great deal about organizing the combat training in the service and party-political work.

The training and indoctrination of commanders in the submarine formations is thoroughly conceived and organized. Relying upon the active assistance of the party organization, the commander, the staff and the political section work in a planned and purposive way to develop good fighting efficiency, moral and political qualities in the commanders. Following instructions from the USSR minister of defense to the effect that "the combat capability of a formation, unit or ship can only be fully realized when the personnel are capable of skillfully employing a new tactic, of surpassing the enemy in the art of conducting a battle or engagement," they attach prime importance to the tactical training of submarine commanders and crews.

The system for learning modern combat tactics includes precisely planned independent work to master the weapons and equipment, the ship's combat capabilities and the theaters of navigation and to learn about the personnel, equipment and tactics of a likely enemy, group exercises and short tactical exercises. A great deal of attention is also devoted to teaching the submarine commanders individually how to rapidly appraise the situation while cruising, how to make the correct decisions, to maneuver skillfully and to take a creative approach in setting up the attack and using the weapons. The formation commander and staff officers regularly go along on cruises, where they help the young submarine commanders on an individual basis to develop independent tactical thinking, to gain confidence in their own abilities and skills and firm crew control and to master the art of modern warfare. I have had the opportunity more than once to watch as the senior chiefs taught the commanders to function competently and corrected their errors, demonstrating patience and pedagogical skill. This focused, individual work is precisely the reason why Captain 3d Rank V. Goncharenko and other officers have become experienced, mature submarine commanders within a short time.

The staff and the staff party organization have concerned themselves with improving the training of commanders and made a large contribution to the improvement of the training materials base. Communists and officers L. Kirsanov, V. Vakhrenov and many others have applied a great deal of creative initiative and work to the establishment of a modern training materials base. They themselves have equipped fine pre-crews, navigation and moral-psychological training centers and a tactical training simulator, where the officers can increase their knowledge, strengthen their skills and train the combat teams in situations with a specified level of difficulty. The experienced specialists teach the commanders the art of conducting warfare by demonstration and by providing an example with their own personal skill. It is a rule in the formation that until a submarine commander and its combat crew are not permitted to work on the exercises at sea until they have learned how to successfully undertake an attack in the simulator.

The political section and the staff have put a lot of work into organizing competition among the submarine commanders for the title "master of the submarine attack" and among the submarine crew members, for the title "best combat team" and for the right to be known as successors to the best specialists of the war years. The results of the combat rivalry are summed up each month. Competition among the submarine commanders and the combat teams in entering into a torpedo attack are organized in the simulator. Staff officers rate the work of each specialist according to a four-point system. The formation commander determines the winner from the total accumulated points and taking into consideration the degree of independence demonstrated in the commander's tactical thinking, how well the operations are coordinated, the precision of control and the quality and effectiveness of the tasks performed at sea. The struggle for first place is a determined one. The photographs of the winners are changed each month on the "Master of the Torpedo Attack" and "Best Combat Team" boards located at headquarters. That is what competition is all about. In the end, all the participants are winners, however, because the combat skill of the submarine commanders and crews is improved.

Ordinarily, reports are presented by the commander and the chief of the formation's political section and by other communists in positions of leadership. Conferences have recently been conducted on the following subjects: "The practical application by commanders of the experience in party-political work described in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books 'Malaya zemlya,' 'Vozrozhdeniye' and 'Tselina' for developing in the personnel good moral qualities and fighting efficiency and preparedness skillfully to defend the homeland," "Fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee 'On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work' and the development in the fighting men of great political awareness and personal responsibility for the defense of the socialist homeland," and "On improving the style of leadership and control in light of decisions coming out of the 25th party congress and the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the conclusions and instructions given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speeches at this plenum and to the electors of Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District." In the seminars the commanders have also discussed the development of ideological conviction, Soviet patriotism, passionate love for the homeland and hatred toward its enemies in the personnel during long cruises, preventing accidents with the weapons and equipment, insuring navigational safety and the strengthening of discipline and solidarity among the submarine crew members, and have exchanged know-how in maintaining communication secrecy, in the effective tactical training of officers and in organizing competition.

All of this is producing definite results. In this year of the anniversary of Lenin's birth the authority and responsibility of the ship commanders have become even greater. On the whole, the development of the young officers advanced to this position is proceeding successfully and is completed relatively rapidly. The fleet has many commanders who have justified

their assignment to this position with their skillful organizational and indoctrinational work, with the level of their competence and professional training and with their high level of skill and combat activeness. These include, among others, Captain 2d Rank M. Kulak, commander of the ASW cruiser "Leningrad," and Captain Lieutenant V. Baranov, commander of the escort vessel "Deyatel'nyy." In cooperation with the political workers and relying upon the assistance of the party and Komsomol organizations, they maintain good combat and work morale, crew solidarity, effective socialist competition, precise organization of the service and the training and indoctrination process, and firm discipline. This makes it possible for the personnel to perform their assigned tasks well, to successfully fulfill their commitments and maintain the ships at a good level of combat readiness. Every decision reached by the commanders and their most daring plans are implemented precisely by the crews, and every training battle ordinarily ends in victory.

During a lengthy cruise the ASW cruiser "Leningrad" found itself more than once in situations which demanded political maturity, a strong will, self-control and quick action on the part of the commander, and great skill, persistence, irreproachable performance and the ability to withstand difficulties on the part of the crew. And each time Captain 2d Rank M. Kulak and his men passed the difficult test of their combat maturity with honor. The cruiser's crew has been awarded the Lenin Certificate of Honor for their good performance in combat and political training and for the successful fulfillment of their socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin.

Captain Lieutenant V. Baranov, commander of the escort vessel "Deyatel'nyy" was also awarded this certificate. On a difficult ocean cruise he and his crew demonstrated the ability to watch over the interests of the Soviet state, exhibited good naval and combat training and good moral-psychological and physical conditioning, and successfully performed all the tasks assigned them. As they were returning from the long cruise, a hypothetical problem was suddenly introduced into the complicated tactical situation, and the "Deyatel'nyy" personnel performed the missile, torpedo and artillery fire extremely well.

I have been on more than one cruise on this vessel and have had the opportunity to observe the dynamics, as it were, of the commander's development. And each time I had the pleasure of seeing for myself how Captain Lieutenant Baranov was steadily acquiring the necessary party and commander's qualities through industry and persistent training, developing as an ASW expert and winning ever increasing authority and respect among his men.

I could give many such examples. We also have shortcomings in the work of selecting, training and indoctrinating ship commanders, however. This applies to the submarine squadron mentioned above. While the new commanders receive maximum attention, those who are considered to be "on their own" already are sometimes neglected. They become complacent and then careless, sometimes even reckless.

It is not an easy matter to develop a good ship commander. From the time a candidate is selected for the position until he has become a competent commander, his superiors need a thorough understanding of pedagogy and the ability to evaluate the officer's political and moral qualities and his performance from a position of principle, and they must demonstrate consideration, concern and sensitivity, combined with uncompromising demandingness. Unfortunately, this is still not the case in the unit in which officer B. Mel'nik serves.

Nothing is so detrimental to the training and development of a ship commander as indulging him and simplifying matters in his combat training. Despite this, we frequently find a senior commander or a unit staff making it easy for a new commander, being lenient with him or even openly simplifying the training. Captain 3d Rank I. Semenov was guilty of such "kindness," for example, and he was punished for it.

The practice of supervising a commander too closely and preventing him from demonstrating initiative has still not been entirely eliminated in certain units. Sometimes a higher headquarters will work out the "battle" plan in such detail, precisely describing each maneuver and the time and procedures for executing the attacks, that the commander has only the mechanical actions to perform. Such practices clearly do not promote the development of independence, creative thinking or combat aggressiveness in the commander. Minute supervision indicates a lack of trust, and this of course hinders the development of the individual's capabilities.

When the results of the winter training period were summed up, the military council directed the attention of unit and formation leaders to these shortcomings and demanded that they be eliminated, that unutilized reserves and possibilities be activated to further increase the authority, raise the professional training level and enhance the personal responsibility of ship commanders. It was also recommended that the advanced know-how accumulated in the fleet be applied more vigorously in their training and indoctrination.

In this year of the anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and of extensive preparations for the 25th CPSU Congress, our commanders are working with special enthusiasm and inspiration, demonstrating greater persistence in mastering the Leninist style of work and striving to perform their military duty in an exemplary manner. We are doing everything possible to support and develop this mood, remembering that the successes achieved by the personnel in the training and competition, the ship's combat readiness and the degree of proficiency with which the tasks involved in defending the homeland's state interests are performed are all inseparably related to the commander.

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MILITARY TRIBUNALS: TEXT OF REVISED STATUTE

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 27 (2049), 2 Jul 80 pp 570-578

[Law of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Introduction of Changes and Additions into the Statute on Military Tribunals]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics resolves:

To introduce into the Statute on Military Tribunals, which was approved as a law of the USSR on 25 December 1958 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSR, No 1, 1959, Article 14; No 9, 1968, Article 64; No 28, 1970, Article 250; No 33, 1971, Article 332; and No 48, 1973, Article 679), changes and additions flowing from the USSR Constitution, having approved a new text for the cited statute.

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet L. Brezhnev

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet M. Georgadze

Moscow, Kremlin, 25 June 1980

No 2371-X

Statute on Military Tribunals

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Article 1. In accordance with the USSR Constitution, military tribunals are USSR courts, are included in the single judicial system of the USSR, and function in the USSR armed forces.

Military tribunals are formed in districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies, flotillas, large units, and garrisons. When necessary, military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces can also be created.

The organization, jurisdiction and procedure for electing the judges and people's assessors of military tribunals in the USSR armed forces are defined by the present statute.

Article 2. Military tribunals, in carrying out the tasks of socialist justice, are called to wage a struggle against infringements on the security of the USSR, the combat capabilities and combat readiness of its armed forces, military discipline, and the prescribed procedure for performing military service.

Article 3. In administering justice, military tribunals are guided by the USSR Constitution, the principles of the laws of the USSR and the union republics on the judicial system in the USSR, the present statute, other laws of the USSR, and laws of the union republics. The verdict and decisions, handed down by military tribunals, are announced in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 4. A military tribunal is elected composed of a chairman, in prescribed cases -- a deputy chairman (deputy chairmen), members of the military tribunal, and people's assessors.

Article 5. USSR citizens, who are on active military service and who have reached 25 years of age by election day, can be elected chairmen, deputy chairmen, and members of military tribunals.

Military tribunal judges are chosen by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for a period of five years and are responsible and accountable to it.

Military tribunal judges can be recalled or discharged early only by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 6. Any [illegible] who is on active military service, can be elected a military tribunal people's assessor.

The people's assessors of military tribunals are elected for a period of two and a half years by open balloting during meetings of servicemen in the troop units. They are responsible to the voters and are accountable to them.

A people's assessor on a military tribunal, who has not justified the trust shown in him, can be recalled by a decision of the voters taken by open balloting during a meeting of the servicemen.

The people's assessors of military tribunals enjoy all the rights of a judge when administering justice.

The procedure for conducting the meetings of servicemen to elect and recall military tribunal people's assessors is defined by the USSR Minister of Justice together with the USSR Minister of Defense.

Article 7. The hearing of criminal and civil cases in military tribunals is carried out collectively.

In a court of first instance, all criminal and civil cases are heard by a judge (chairman, deputy chairman, or military tribunal member) and two people's assessors.

The hearing of cases in military tribunals during appeals and supervision procedures is performed by three military tribunal judges.

Article 8. The judges and people's assessors on military tribunals are independent and are subject only to the law.

Article 9. The judges of military tribunals as well as the military tribunal people's assessors, when performing their duties on a court, cannot have criminal proceedings instituted against them, be arrested, or subjected to administrative punishment imposed during judicial procedures without the consent of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 10. The judges of military tribunals are responsible in a disciplinary way for violations of military discipline and for service misdemeanors under the system prescribed by the laws of the USSR for the disciplinary liability of judges.

Chapter 2. Cases Under the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals

Article 11. Military tribunals have jurisdiction over:

1) cases involving all crimes committed by servicemen and reservists during their service at courses of instruction;

2) cases involving all crimes committed by members of the officer corps, warrant officers, sergeants, master sergeants, soldiers and sailors of the state security organs;

3) cases involving crimes against the procedure prescribed for performing service, which are committed by members of the leadership element of correctional labor establishments;

4) all cases of espionage;

5) cases involving crimes, committed by persons, regarding whom there are special instructions in the laws of the USSR.

Article 12. In locations where under exceptional circumstances there are no general courts operating, military tribunals hear all civil and criminal cases.

Article 13. Military tribunals hear along with criminal cases the civil actions of troop units; state enterprises, establishments and organizations; kolkhoz; other cooperative organizations; their associations; other public organizations, and citizens involving compensation for material damages caused them by the crimes.

Article 14. When there is a charge against one person or group of persons for the commission of several crimes, and the matter involving one of the crimes is under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal and that of the others is under the jurisdiction of some other court, the case involving all the crimes is heard by a military tribunal.

Article 15. Cases involving crimes committed by persons mentioned in points 1,2 and 3 of Article 11 of the present statute while performing their service but who have been discharged before the case is heard in court, are heard in military tribunals.

Cases involving crimes committed by persons before their induction into military service or arrival for service in the state security organs but who have entered on military service or service in state security organs before the case is heard, are heard by the general courts.

Article 16. Cases involving the crimes of persons who have a military rank of lieutenant colonel or captain 2d rank, inclusive, and all civil actions in the cases provided for by Article 12 of the present statute are under the jurisdiction of the military tribunals of armies, flotillas, large units and garrisons.

Article 17. The military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets have jurisdiction over:

1) cases involving the crimes of persons having the military rank of colonel and captain 1st rank;

2) cases involving the crimes of persons occupying the position of regimental commander, commander of a ship of the first rank and higher, and persons equivalent to them in service position;

3) cases involving all crimes for which the death penalty is prescribed by law during peacetime.

Article 18. The Military College of the USSR Supreme Court has under its jurisdiction cases of exceptional importance and cases involving the crimes of servicemen having the military rank of general (admiral) or occupying the position of large unit commander or higher and those equivalent to them.

Article 19. The question of transferring cases from the military tribunals of one branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces, or fleet to the military tribunals of another branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces, or fleet is decided by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College.

Within a branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces, or fleet, the question of transforming a case from one military tribunal to another is decided by the chairman of the military tribunal of the branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces, or fleet.

Article 20. A higher military tribunal and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College have a right to accept any case, over which a lower military tribunal has jurisdiction, for hearing as a court of first instance.

Chapter 3. Supervision Over the Judicial Activity of Military Tribunals

Article 21. Supervision over the judicial activity of military tribunals is exercised by the USSR Supreme Court and by the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets within the limits of their jurisdiction.

Article 22. The Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court:

1) considers as a supervisory check, in accordance with the protests of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and USSR General Procurator and the findings of the USSR General Procurator on newly uncovered circumstances, cases settled by military tribunals for which determinations have been announced by the Military College of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

2) hears reports by the chairmen of the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets on the practices of the military tribunals' application of USSR laws and on the implementation of the guidance interpretations of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum.

The chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and his deputies in ensuring the USSR Supreme Court's work of supervising the judicial activity of military tribunals, act within the limits of the authority given to them by the USSR law "On the USSR Supreme Court."

Article 23. The Military College of the USSR Supreme Court.

1) considers appeals, private complaints and protests against the decisions, verdicts, and determinations of military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, fleets and against the decrees of the judges of these tribunals;

2) considers as a supervisory check the protests of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR General Procurator, their deputies, the chairman of the Military College of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Chief Military Procurator against the decisions, verdicts and determinations of the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets and against the decrees of the judges of these tribunals.

3) considers, in accordance with the findings of the USSR General Procurator or Chief Military Procurator on newly uncovered circumstances, cases in which decisions, verdicts or determinations have been pronounced by the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

The Chairman of the Military College of the USSR Supreme Court, in ensuring the college's work of supervising the judicial activity of military tribunals, has a right to demand and obtain court cases heard by military tribunals in order to make a supervisory check and study and sum up judicial practices; organizes the work of making a supervisory check of the court cases brought to it and sub a its protests in cases provided by law; organizes the work of studying and summing up judicial practices, of analyzing the court statistics of military tribunals and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College, and of exercising control over the military tribunals' implementation of the guidance interpretations of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum and uses the results of this activity of the college to ensure correct and uniform application of the law during the administration of justice by military tribunals.

Article 24. Military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets:

1) consider appeals, private complaints and protests against the decisions, verdicts and determinations of the military tribunals of armies, flotillas, large units and garrisons and against the decrees of the judges of these tribunals;

2) consider as a supervisory check the protests of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, the USSR General Procurator, their deputies, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College, the Chief Military Procurator, his deputies, the chairman of the military tribunals, and the military procurators of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets against the decisions, verdicts and determinations of the military tribunals of armies, flotillas, large units and garrisons which have entered into legal effect and against the decrees of the judges of these tribunals;

3) consider, in accordance with the findings of the USSR General Procurator, the Chief Military Procurator, their deputies, and the military procurators of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets about newly uncovered circumstances, criminal cases in which verdicts or determinations have been announced by the military tribunals of arries, flotillas, large units, and garrisons;

4) consider, in accordance with applications by persons who are participants in a case or of the procurator about newly uncovered circumstances, civil cases in which decisions and determinations have been announced by the military tribunals of armies, flotillas, large units, and garrisons.

The chairman of a military tribunal of a branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces and fleet, in ensuring the work of the appropriate tribunal in supervising the judicial activity of lower tribunals, has a right to demand and obtain court cases in order to make a supervisory check and to study and sum up judicial practices; organizes the work of making a supervisory check of the court cases brought to it and sut a its protests in cases provided by law; organizes the work of studying and summarizing judicial practices, of analyzing court statistics, and of exercising control over the military tribunals' implementation of the guidance interpretations of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum and uses the results of this activity to ensure correct and uniform application of the law during the administration of justice by military tribunals.

Chapter 4. Organizational Leadership of Military Tribunals. The Organization of Work in a Military Tribunal.

Article 25. The organizational leadership of military tribunals is exercised by the USSR Ministry of Justice and the chairmen of the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets within the limits of their competency.

Article 26. The USSR Ministry of Justice and its Directorate of Military Tribunals carry out:

1) a check of the organization of the work of military tribunals and take steps to improve it;

2) a study and summation of the judicial practices of military tribunals, coordinating this activity respectively with the USSR Supreme Court and its Military College, and organize the work of compiling court statistics. They use the results of the summation and the legal statistical data to eliminate deficiencies in the organization of the military tribunals' work;

3) the selection and training of military tribunal personnel, their retraining, and improving of work qualifications;

4) the organizational and instructional methods direction of the military tribunals' work in publicizing legal knowledge, explaining laws, and providing legal help to comrades' courts;

5) the preparation, together with the USSR Ministry of Defense, of proposals on questions concerning the organization of military tribunals.

The USSR Minister of Justice and the chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice issue orders on questions concerning the organization of the military tribunals' work.

Article 27. The chairman of a military tribunal of a branch of the USSR armed forces, district, group of forces, and fleet:

1) exercises direction of the work of the military tribunal;

2) checks on the work organization of the military tribunals of armies, flotillas, large units, and garrisons and takes steps to improve it;

3) organizes the work of studying and summarizing judicial practices and the compiling of legal statistics by military tribunals, and uses the results of the summation and the legal statistical data to eliminate deficiencies in the work organization of military tribunals;

4) directs the work of military tribunals in publicizing legal knowledge, explaining laws and providing legal help to comrades' courts, coordinating this activity with the command element, political organs, and the military procurator;

5) directs the work of training and improving the qualifications of military tribunal personnel;

6) determines in coordination with the military council the number of people's assessors for the military tribunals;

Article 28. The chairman of a military tribunal of an army, flotilla, large unit, and garrison:

1) exercises direction over the work of the military tribunal;

2) directs the study of legal practices and the compilation of legal statistics in a military tribunal;

3) conducts the work of training and increasing the qualifications of military tribunal personnel;

4) organizes the work of publicizing legal knowledge, explaining laws, and providing legal help to comrades' courts, coordinating this activity with the command element, political organs, and the military procurator.

The chairman of a military tribunal of an army, flotilla, large unit, and garrison issues within the limits of his competency orders on questions concerning the work organization of the military tribunal.

Article 29. The chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice within the limits of his competency informs the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the commanders of the branches of the USSR armed forces

and the command element and political organs of border and internal troops about question which arise from the organizational leadership of military tribunals.

The chairmen of the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies, and flotillas inform the appropriate military councils of questions arising from the activity of the military tribunals, and the chairmen of the military tribunals of large units and garrisons -- the appropriate military command element and political organs.

Chapter 5. The Staffing and Logistics Support of Military Tribunals

Article 30. The structure and staff of military tribunals and the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice are determined by the USSR Ministry of Justice together with the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The structure and authorized strength of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College apparat are approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in accordance with the joint representation of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Minister of Defense.

The personnel of military tribunals, the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College are included in the authorized strength of the USSR armed forces and are provided all types of allowances equally with the personnel of the troop units and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The list of authorized positions for judges of military tribunals and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College and of the military ranks corresponding to these positions is approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: for military tribunals -- in accordance with a joint representation of the USSR Minister of Justice and USSR Minister of Defense; for the USSR Supreme Court's Military College -- in accordance with the joint representation of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Minister of Defense.

Article 31. The officer complement, warrant officers, sergeants and master sergeants of military tribunals, the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice, and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College are on active duty and the statutes on performing military service, military regulations and the orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, which define procedures for performing service, extend to them.

The conferring of junior and senior officer military ranks takes place in the order prescribed by the USSR Council of Ministers. For the servicemen of military tribunals and the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR

Ministry of Justice -- in accordance with the representation of the chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice and the chairmen of the military tribunals of the branches of the USSR armed forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets; for servicemen of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College -- in accordance with the representation of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College.

Military ranks are conferred on the servicemen of military tribunals and the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice by the USSR Council of Ministers in accordance with the joint representations of the USSR Minister of Justice and USSR Minister of Defense, and servicemen of the USSR Supreme Court's Military College -- by the USSR Council of Ministers in accordance with the joint representation of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and USSR Minister of Defense.

Article 32. The appointment of the workers and employees of military tribunals and their release from positions are done by the chairman of the appropriate military tribunal.

Article 33. The logistic support, financing, providing of transportation and communications equipment, and storage of the archive materials of military tribunals, the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Supreme Court's Military College are placed on the corresponding USSR Ministry of Defense establishment.

The guarding of the work premises of military tribunals is performed by troop units of the large units and garrisons where the military tribunals are operating.

The escorting of arrested persons to military tribunals and their guarding are performed by troop units of the large units and garrisons, where the military tribunals are operating, and by the units (subunits) of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs designated to service military tribunals in the cities where they are located.

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MILITARY BALANCE: SOVIET VIEW ON U.S. DRIVE FOR SUPERIORITY

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 3 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Svyatoslav Kozlov, APN political observer: "In Pursuit of Superiority"]

[Text] The openly militaristic policy being pursued with particular persistence by the present administration in the White House clearly aims at creating unprecedently vast military force potential. According to a statement made by U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown, this is necessary in order for the NATO bloc to be able to "achieve clear military superiority by the mid-1980's" over the Warsaw Pact Organization. In other words, we are dealing with plans for premeditated disruption of the strategic parity achieved between the two military alliances. Prominent military expert in international affairs' candidate of Military Sciences S. N. Kozlov discusses this U.S. policy, which presents a threat to peace.

Present U.S. leaders criticize their predecessors for their alleged miscalculation in arms escalation and claim for themselves credit for a shift to a higher level of military expenditures and preparations.

And yet in the interest of truth we should state that the preceding masters in the White House raised beyond any need or necessity the level of U.S. military strength, and with it the level of military threat in the world. Behind all this is concealed an unabating and systematic effort on the part of U.S. ruling circles to achieve military predominance, not some kind of mythical U.S. "lag" in arms. The history of the arms race convincingly demonstrates that at all its stages the smoke screen of the myth of a "Soviet threat" pursued a single objective -- to secure for the United States advantages in the development of new weapons. This is supported by incontrovertible facts.

Immediately following World War II, having preserved its little-expended high military potential, it was precisely the United States which immediately set the tone in the arms race. The arms race began basically with the

brief U.S. nuclear weapons monopoly and the U.S. endeavor to continue its dominance in this area. Having initially selected heavy bombers as nuclear weapons delivery platforms, the Americans were the first to build an enormous fleet of transcontinental heavy bombers.

Subsequently, following development of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the United States directed its attention toward the sea. The first missile-armed nuclear submarines bore the stamp "Made in USA." Thus appeared the notorious "triad" of nuclear offensive forces.

A dangerous leap forward in ICBM development took place as a consequence of the appearance of U.S. multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle warheads (MIRV). Subsequently the United States placed its cards on primacy in development of a new type of strategic missile -- cruise missiles, as well as neutron warheads.

In all cases, in the interests of its own security and that of its allies, the USSR was compelled to prevent the West from achieving even a temporary advantage and to restore the disrupted balance.

The presently-occurring new round in the arms race, which involves improvement of already known weapons, building up stockpiles of these weapons and developing new types and systems of means of destruction, is also taking place at the initiative and by the efforts of the U.S. militarists. They are lavishing funds toward this end, following one record military budget with another. In the course of the next five years U.S. military expenditures will grow to the astronomical sum of one trillion dollars!

The largest amounts are being allocated for improving the nuclear "triad." Minuteman land-based missiles (there are one thousand of these) are being armed with new Mk-12A warheads, with double the yield (350 kilotons in each of three warheads in place of 170 kt). Poseidon missile-armed nuclear submarines (41 submarines carrying 16 missiles each) are being armed with Trident missiles, which are longer range, more powerful and accurate. The first Trident submarine has been launched. This submarine is designed to carry 24 missiles, each of which can carry up to 10 self-guiding warheads. The B-52 bomber is being modernized and will be able to carry 20 cruise missiles. The "triad" is becoming a "tetrad," for plans call for adding ground and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles.

All other U.S. arms are also being qualitatively improved and at the same time quantitatively increased. For a beginning, the ground forces are receiving approximately 2,000 new XM-1 tanks. Artillery is being adapted to fire neutron warheads. The air forces are receiving new F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers, plus other equipment. The Navy is receiving new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers and other warships, the total number of which will increase from 458 to 550 ships by 1990.

While improving and building up its existing arsenal of weapons, the Pentagon is devoting considerable attention to new weapons and weapons systems.

Preparations are being made to produce the MX mobile ICBM, with from 70 to 100 billion dollars to be spent on their deployment. The decision has been made to deploy in European NATO countries new intermediate-range missiles. Stockpiles of the most lethal chemical warfare agents are being established. Development of bacteriological weapons is continuing.

The Pentagon is devoting particular attention to space offensive weapons and antisatellite weapons, radiological and laser weapons. A total of two billion dollars has already been spent on the latter. One readily notes that priority is being given to offensive-type weapons.

The United States' NATO partners are becoming increasingly drawn into an unchecked arms race.

Within the confines of a single short article it is difficult even to enumerate, let alone comment on all those new means of destruction which are being developed, produced and deployed by the Pentagon in the name of politics of force and to the greater satisfaction of the insatiable appetite of the military-industrial complex. Even a cursory overview, however, gives a picture of what a genuine and terrible threat to the peace on this planet and to the very existence of mankind is created by the reckless aggressive policy of U.S. ruling circles which aims at achieving military superiority.

Particularly since the impossibility of achieving this ridiculous goal is obvious: the USSR and its allies consider the existing parity in arms to be the condition in force for universal security and will not permit this parity to be disrupted. This of course compels the nations of the socialist community to display vigilance and to take the necessary measures to preserve the balance which the West is endeavoring to disrupt. But this means that precisely the United States and the other NATO countries bear the entire responsibility for the inevitable rise, prompted by them, in the level of military confrontation, in defiance of the imperative of holding the arms race in check.

But one more the international atmosphere becomes artificially heated up through the efforts of aggressive circles in the West, the more essential and urgent it becomes to take measures to achieve further détente. The only effective means to achieve this goal is honorable, equal and productive talks on all unresolved problems of international relations, especially pertaining to ensuring universal security. Such is the firm conviction of the nations of the socialist community, which are pursuing persistent efforts in this direction. Many also agree with this, at least in word, in the West as well, where there are fairly frequently heard voices expressing willingness for such talks.

Verbal willingness, however, is unfortunately not being backed up by concrete, constructive, specific programs of action: the West is failing to propose its own generally-acceptable programs, while those programs which are proposed to the West for discussion are rejected out of hand.

In addition, all NATO practical activities, from adoption and implementation of plans for long-term military preparations to threatening military displays of force, are in fact undermining the very principles of these needed talks. These foundations consist in unswerving observance of agreed-upon principles of equal security of the two sides, preservation of the existing balance of power, and prohibition of unilateral advantage. To substantiate what we have said, we shall take a few facts as illustrations.

The West artificially created the problem of "arming NATO up to an adequate level." Ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union had for many years been deploying certain intermediate-range weapons on Soviet soil, balancing the vast arsenal of "forward-based" weapons which had previously been deployed by the United States and its allies in Western Europe, NATO officials advanced the phony thesis of "disturbance of the balance" on the part of the USSR. Utilizing this concocted fabrication, NATO made the dangerous decision to produce and deploy on the territory of a number of NATO member nations as many as 600 units of a new type of U.S. intermediate range strategic nuclear missile. This will substantially increase the number of "forward-based" weapons and will change the existing balance to favor NATO unilaterally and to the detriment of the security of the Warsaw Pact.

Talks on intermediate range missiles proposed to the West under the condition that NATO reverses the decision to build and deploy new missiles, or at least an official halt to this program, have been rejected out of hand. The most recent session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group not only confirmed this rash decision but also took measures toward its practical implementation.

The accompanying suggestion to conduct talks on these weapons concomitantly with implementation of this program cannot be considered acceptable, for it legitimizes the one-sided advantage which the West seeks to obtain in order to conduct a dialogue "from a position of strength." One can also scarcely consider constructive the opinion expressed in the West which calls for a three-year "freeze" on deployment of these missiles and the holding of talks during this time. We must first of all determine how this proposal differs from the NATO proposal: are we talking about a moratorium only on deployment or on production and deployment?

The proposed period of time -- three years -- is also suspicious. This is precisely that period of time during which the NATO decision is to be implemented. Is it not possible that the talks to be held will serve merely to conceal implementation of this dangerous program? And who will guarantee that, having chosen the term "freeze," NATO will not, in place of a clear-cut abandonment of this weapon, abandon the talks as soon as the weapon is coming off the production line?

A pitiful example of this kind of tactics is the marathon in Vienna, which has dragged on year after year, where conditions for force and arms reductions in Central Europe are being discussed, while at the same time

the West is undertaking systematic measures to build up its forces and arms in this region, including the future deployment of intermediate-range missiles.

But there are even more glaring facts which foster serious doubts regarding the intentions of NATO. That same Nuclear Planning Group session sanctioned an increase in the NATO arsenal of chemical weapons. And this was done at the same time as bilateral Soviet-American talks are being held, as well as a multilateral discussion by the U.N. Committee on Disarmament of a draft international convention, proposed by the USSR and its allies, calling for the banning and elimination of this dangerous means of mass destruction, a proposal which has been approved in principle by the United Nations.

In addition, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is still in effect, which prohibits the employment of toxic agents for military purposes. And this Protocol was signed by more than 90 nations, including the members of NATO, and was ratified by them, including the United States (following a delay of 50 years, to be sure).

It seems that international agreements are one thing, while the practice of ignoring the letter and spirit of these agreements is another thing altogether. One is hard put to trust those who, while proposing new talks, cynically ignore previously-signed agreements.

The West rejects talks just as readily as it advances positions which are deliberately unacceptable to the other side, in order to accuse the latter of intransigence. An example of this is the dialogue between the USSR and the United States, which was initiated in a serious manner, on reducing the level of military activity in the Indian Ocean. The success of these talks was to constitute the beginning of a process of demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and its transformation into a peace zone, in conformity with a UN resolution.

The United States, however, broke off the talks unilaterally and without warning, and began a massive push to build up its military presence in this region. This reflected complete disregard of the will of peoples formally stated in a binding document of an international organization and displayed a voluntaristic approach to international cooperation.

As we see, there is a fairly strong basis for the claim that the United States is an unreliable partner in negotiations and cooperation. And it is particularly unfortunate that the United States' NATO allies meekly follow behind their senior partner in his unpredictable and therefore doubly dangerous policies.

Nevertheless, supported by their unsurpassed might and receiving vigorous support by peace-loving peoples, and appraising on their merits indications of realism, which are not always consistent, to be sure, but nevertheless which exist in the West, particularly among the NATO members and,

most important, proceeding from the interests of strengthening peace, détente and general security, the nations of the Warsaw Pact are continuing their efforts in the campaign for détente. They feel that it is essential to reach rapid agreement in talks which are in progress, to resume interrupted talks without delay, and to initiate new talks which would bring without delay a solution to the critical problems of military détente and disarmament, beginning with expanding and deepening international trust, which has been seriously shaken by the West. This goal should be particularly promoted by the meeting in Madrid, at which there should ensue a concrete decision on the matter of convening an All-European Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament in Europe.

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